Solution: Communications Question

communications question and need the explanation and answer to help me learn.

For this assignment, read Dewey’s essay “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy” (beginning at section V on p.24). In your own words (3-4 sentences, summarize Dewey’s discussion of reality in the two paragraphs on pages 25-26 (beginning with the sentence “It is often said that pragmatism…” and ending at the top of p.26). Note: in these paragraphs, Dewey uses the German word “uberhaupt,” which can be translated “in general.”
The file where you can find the essay is below:
Requirements: Few sentences only (easy)
TheNeedforaRecoveryofPhilosophy∗JohnDeweyIntellectualadvanceoccursintwoways.Attimesincreaseofknowledgeisorganizedaboutoldconceptions,whiletheseareexpanded,elaboratedandreﬁned,butnotseriouslyrevised,muchlessabandoned.Atothertimes,theincreaseofknowledgedemandsqualitativeratherthanquantitativechange;alteration,notaddition.Men’smindsgrowcoldtotheirformerintellectualconcerns;ideasthatwereburningfade;intereststhatwereurgentseemremote.Menfaceinanotherdirection;theirolderperplexitiesareunreal;considerationspassedoverasnegligibleloomup.Formerproblemsmaynothavebeensolved,buttheynolongerpressforsolutions.Philosophyisnoexceptiontotherule.Butitisunusuallyconservative—not,necessarily,inproﬀeringsolutions,butinclingingtoproblems.Ithasbeensoalliedwiththeologyandtheologicalmoralsasrepresentativesofmen’schiefinterests,thatradicalalterationhasbeenshocking.Men’sactivitiestookadecidedlynewturn,forexample,intheseventeenthcentury,anditseemsasifphilosophy,undertheleadofthinkerslikeBaconandDescartes,wastoexecuteanabout-face.But,inspiteoftheferment,itturnedoutthatmanyoftheolderproblemswerebuttranslatedfromLatinintothevernacularorintothenewterminologyfurnishedbyscience.Theassociationofphilosophywithacademicteachinghasreinforcedthisintrinsicconservatism.Scholasticphilosophypersistedinuniversitiesaftermen’sthoughtsoutsideofthewallsofcollegeshadmovedinotherdirections.Inthelasthundredyearsintellectualadvancesofscienceandpoliticshaveinlikefashionbeencrystallizedintomaterialofinstructionandnowresistfurtherchange.Iwouldnotsaythatthespiritofteachingishostiletothatofliberalinquiry,butaphilosophywhichexistslargelyassomethingtobetaughtratherthanwhollyassomethingtobereﬂecteduponisconducivetodiscussionofviewsheldbyothersratherthantoimmediateresponse.Philosophywhentaughtinevitablymagniﬁesthehistoryofpastthought,andleadsprofessionalphilosopherstoapproachtheirsubject-matterthroughitsformulationinreceivedsystems.Ittends,also,toemphasizepointsuponwhichmenhavedividedintoschools,fortheselendthemselvestoretrospectivedeﬁnitionandelaboration.Consequently,∗OriginallypublishedinCreativeIntelligence:EssaysinthePragmaticAttitude(1917),acollectionofessaysputtogetherbyJohnDewey,AddisonW.Moore,HaroldChapmanBrown,GeorgeH.Mead,BoydH.Bode,HenryWaldgraveStuart,JamesHaydenTufts,andHoraceM.Kallen;ch1,pp.3-69.ThistextisbasedonthetextpreparedbyProjectGutenberg,EBook#33727,http://www.gutenberg.org/.Thechapterincludedhereisunabridged.Allfootnotesarefromtheoriginaltext.ThisversionpreparedbyMatthewJ.Brown,Fall2018.1
philosophicaldiscussionislikelytobeadressingoutofantitheticaltraditions,wherecriticismofoneviewisthoughttoaﬀordproofofthetruthofitsopposite(asifformulationofviewsguaranteedlogicalexclusives).Directpreoccupationwithcontemporarydiﬃcultiesislefttoliteratureandpolitics.Ifchangingconductandexpandingknowledgeeverrequiredawillingnesstosurrendernotmerelyoldsolutionsbutoldproblemsitisnow.Idonotmeanthatwecanturnabruptlyawayfromalltraditionalissues.Thisisimpossible;itwouldbetheundoingoftheonewhoattemptedit.Irrespectiveoftheprofessionalizingofphilosophy,theideasphilosophersdiscussarestillthoseinwhichWesterncivilizationhasbeenbred.Theyareinthebacksoftheheadsofeducatedpeople.Butwhatserious-mindedmennotengagedintheprofessionalbusinessofphilosophymostwanttoknowiswhatmodiﬁcationsandabandonmentsofintellectualinheritancearerequiredbythenewerindustrial,political,andscientiﬁcmovements.Theywanttoknowwhatthesenewermovementsmeanwhentranslatedintogeneralideas.Unlessprofessionalphilosophycanmobilizeitselfsuﬃcientlytoassistinthisclariﬁcationandredirectionofmen’sthoughts,itislikelytogetmoreandmoresidetrackedfromthemaincurrentsofcontemporarylife.Thisessaymay,then,belookeduponasanattempttoforwardtheemanci-pationofphilosophyfromtoointimateandexclusiveattachmenttotraditionalproblems.Itisnotinintentacriticismofvarioussolutionsthathavebeenoﬀered,butraisesaquestionastothegenuineness,underthepresentconditionsofscienceandsociallife,oftheproblems.Thelimitedobjectofmydiscussionwill,doubtless,giveanexaggeratedimpressionofmyconvictionastotheartiﬁcialityofmuchrecentphilosophizing.NotthatIhavewilfullyexaggeratedinwhatIhavesaid,butthatthelimitationsofmypurposehaveledmenottosaymanythingspertinenttoabroaderpurpose.Adiscussionlessrestrictedwouldstrivetoenforcethegenuineness,intheirowncontext,ofquestionsnowdiscussedmainlybecausetheyhavebeendiscussedratherthanbecausecontemporaryconditionsoflifesuggestthem.Itwouldalsobeagratefultasktodwelluponthepreciouscontributionsmadebyphilosophicsystemswhichasawholeareimpossible.Inthecourseofthedevelopmentofunrealpremisesandthediscussionofartiﬁcialproblems,pointsofviewhaveemergedwhichareindispensablepossessionsofculture.Thehorizonhasbeenwidened;ideasofgreatfecunditystruckout;imaginationquickened;asenseofthemeaningofthingscreated.Itmayevenbeaskedwhethertheseaccompanimentsofclassicsystemshavenotoftenbeentreatedasakindofguaranteeofthesystemsthemselves.ButwhileitisasignofanilliberalmindtothrowawaythefertileandampleideasofaSpinoza,aKant,oraHegel,becausetheirsettingisnotlogicallyadequate,issurelyasignofanundisciplinedonetotreattheircontributionstocultureasconﬁrmationsofpremiseswithwhichtheyhavenonecessaryconnection.2
IAcriticismofcurrentphilosophizingfromthestandpointofthetraditionalqualityofitsproblemsmustbeginsomewhere,andthechoiceofabeginningisarbitrary.Ithasappearedtomethatthenotionofexperienceimpliedinthequestionsmostactivelydiscussedgivesanaturalpointofdeparture.For,ifImistakenot,itisjusttheinheritedviewofexperiencecommontotheempiricalschoolanditsopponentswhichkeepsalivemanydiscussionsevenofmattersthatontheirfacearequiteremotefromit,whileitisalsothisviewwhichismostuntenableinthelightofexistingscienceandsocialpractice.AccordinglyIsetoutwithabriefstatementofsomeofthechiefcontrastsbetweentheorthodoxdescriptionofexperienceandthatcongenialtopresentconditions.(i)Intheorthodoxview,experienceisregardedprimarilyasaknowledge-aﬀair.Buttoeyesnotlookingthroughancientspectacles,itassuredlyappearsasanaﬀairoftheintercourseofalivingbeingwithitsphysicalandsocialenvironment.(ii)Accordingtotraditionexperienceis(atleastprimarily)apsychicalthing,infectedthroughoutby“subjectivity.”Whatexperiencesuggestsaboutitselfisagenuinelyobjectiveworldwhichentersintotheactionsandsuﬀeringsofmenandundergoesmodiﬁcationsthroughtheirresponses.(iii)Sofarasanythingbeyondabarepresentisrecognizedbytheestablisheddoctrine,thepastexclusivelycounts.Registrationofwhathastakenplace,referencetoprecedent,isbelievedtobetheessenceofexperience.Empiricismisconceivedofastieduptowhathasbeen,oris,“given.”Butexperienceinitsvitalformisexperimental,aneﬀorttochangethegiven;itischaracterizedbyprojection,byreachingforwardintotheunknown;connexionwithafutureisitssalienttrait.(iv)Theempiricaltraditioniscommittedtoparticularism.Connexionsandcontinuitiesaresupposedtobeforeigntoexperience,tobeby-productsofdubiousvalidity.Anexperiencethatisanundergoingofanenvironmentandastrivingforitscontrolinnewdirectionsispregnantwithconnexions.(v)Inthetraditionalnotionexperienceandthoughtareantitheticalterms.Inference,sofarasitisotherthanarevivalofwhathasbeengiveninthepast,goesbeyondexperience;henceitiseitherinvalid,orelseameasureofdesperationbywhich,usingexperienceasaspringboard,wejumpouttoaworldofstablethingsandotherselves.Butexperience,takenfreeoftherestrictionsimposedbytheolderconcept,isfullofinference.Thereis,apparently,noconsciousexperiencewithoutinference;reﬂectionisnativeandconstant.Thesecontrasts,withaconsiderationoftheeﬀectofsubstitutingtheaccountofexperiencerelevanttomodernlifefortheinheritedaccount,aﬀordthesubject-matterofthefollowingdiscussion.Supposewetakeseriouslythecontributionmadetoourideaofexperiencebybiology,—notthatrecentbiologicalsciencediscoveredthefacts,butthatithassoemphasizedthemthatthereisnolongeranexcuseforignoringthemortreatingthemasnegligible.Anyaccountofexperiencemustnowﬁtintotheconsiderationthatexperiencingmeansliving;andthatlivinggoesoninandbecauseofanenvironingmedium,notinavacuum.Wherethereisexperience,thereisalivingbeing.Wherethereislife,thereisadoubleconnexionmaintainedwith3
theenvironment.Inpart,environmentalenergiesconstituteorganicfunctions;theyenterintothem.Lifeisnotpossiblewithoutsuchdirectsupportbytheenvironment.Butwhileallorganicchangesdependuponthenaturalenergiesoftheenvironmentfortheiroriginationandoccurrence,thenaturalenergiessometimescarrytheorganicfunctionsprosperouslyforward,andsometimesactcountertotheircontinuance.Growthanddecay,healthanddisease,arealikecontinuouswithactivitiesofthenaturalsurroundings.Thediﬀerenceliesinthebearingofwhathappensuponfuturelife-activity.Fromthestandpointofthisfuturereferenceenvironmentalincidentsfallintogroups:thosefavorabletolife-activities,andthosehostile.Thesuccessfulactivitiesoftheorganism,thosewithinwhichenvironmentalassistanceisincorporated,reactupontheenvironmenttobringaboutmodiﬁca-tionsfavorabletotheirownfuture.Thehumanbeinghasuponhishandstheproblemofrespondingtowhatisgoingonaroundhimsothatthesechangeswilltakeoneturnratherthananother,namely,thatrequiredbyitsownfurtherfunctioning.Whilebackedinpartbytheenvironment,itslifeisanythingbutapeacefulexhalationofenvironment.Itisobligedtostruggle—thatistosay,toemploythedirectsupportgivenbytheenvironmentinorderindirectlytoeﬀectchangesthatwouldnototherwiseoccur.Inthissense,lifegoesonbymeansofcontrollingtheenvironment.Itsactivitiesmustchangethechangesgoingonaroundit;theymustneutralizehostileoccurrences;theymusttransformneutraleventsintocoöperativefactorsorintoaneﬄorescenceofnewfeatures.Dialecticdevelopmentsofthenotionofself-preservation,oftheconatusessendi,oftenignorealltheimportantfactsoftheactualprocess.Theyargueasifself-control,self-development,wentondirectlyasasortofunrollingpushfromwithin.Butlifeenduresonlyinvirtueofthesupportoftheenvironment.Andsincetheenvironmentisonlyincompletelyenlistedinourbehalf,self-preservation—orself-realizationorwhatever—isalwaysindirect—alwaysanaﬀairofthewayinwhichourpresentactivitiesaﬀectthedirectiontakenbyindependentchangesinthesurroundings.Hindrancesmustbeturnedintomeans.Wearealsogiventoplayingloosewiththeconceptionofadjustment,asifthatmeantsomethingﬁxed—akindofaccommodationonceforall(ideallyatleast)oftheorganismtoanenvironment.Butasliferequirestheﬁtnessoftheenvironmenttotheorganicfunctions,adjustmenttotheenvironmentmeansnotpassiveacceptanceofthelatter,butactingsothattheenvironingchangestakeacertainturn.The“higher”thetypeoflife,themoreadjustmenttakestheformofanadjustingofthefactorsoftheenvironmenttooneanotherintheinterestoflife;thelessthesigniﬁcanceofliving,themoreitbecomesanadjustmenttoagivenenvironmenttillatthelowerendofthescalethediﬀerencesbetweenlivingandthenon-livingdisappear.Thesestatementsareofanexternalkind.Theyareabouttheconditionsofexperience,ratherthanaboutexperiencingitself.Butassuredlyexperienceasitconcretelytakesplacebearsoutthestatements.Experienceisprimarilyaprocessofundergoing:aprocessofstandingsomething;ofsuﬀeringandpassion,ofaﬀection,intheliteralsenseofthesewords.Theorganismhastoendure,toundergo,theconsequencesofitsownactions.Experienceisnoslippingalong4
inapathﬁxedbyinnerconsciousness.Privateconsciousnessisanincidentaloutcomeofexperienceofavitalobjectivesort;itisnotitssource.Undergoing,however,isnevermerepassivity.Themostpatientpatientismorethanareceptor.Heisalsoanagent—areactor,onetryingexperiments,oneconcernedwithundergoinginawaywhichmayinﬂuencewhatisstilltohappen.Sheerendurance,side-steppingevasions,are,afterall,waysoftreatingtheenvironmentwithaviewtowhatsuchtreatmentwillaccomplish.Evenifweshutourselvesupinthemostclam-likefashion,wearedoingsomething;ourpassivityisanactiveattitude,notanextinctionofresponse.Justasthereisnoassertiveaction,noaggressiveattackuponthingsastheyare,whichisallaction,sothereisnoundergoingwhichisnotonourpartalsoagoingonandagoingthrough.Experience,inotherwords,isamatterofsimultaneousdoingsandsuﬀerings.Ourundergoingsareexperimentsinvaryingthecourseofevents;ouractivetryingsaretrialsandtestsofourselves.Thisduplicityofexperienceshowsitselfinourhappinessandmisery,oursuccessesandfailures.Triumphsaredangerouswhendweltuponorlivedoﬀfrom;successesusethemselvesup.Anyachievedequilibriumofadjustmentwiththeenvironmentisprecariousbecausewecannotevenlykeeppacewithchangesintheenvironment.Thesearesoopposedindirectionthatwemustchoose.Wemusttaketheriskofcastinginourlotwithonemovementortheother.Nothingcaneliminateallrisk,alladventure;theonethingdoomedtofailureistotrytokeepevenwiththewholeenvironmentatonce—thatistosay,tomaintainthehappymomentwhenallthingsgoourway.Theobstacleswhichconfrontusarestimulitovariation,tonovelresponse,andhenceareoccasionsofprogress.Ifafavordoneusbytheenvironmentconcealsathreat,soitsdisfavorisapotentialmeansofhithertounexperiencedmodesofsuccess.Totreatmiseryasanythingbutmisery,asforexampleablessingindisguiseoranecessaryfactoringood,isdisingenuousapologetics.Buttosaythattheprogressoftheracehasbeenstimulatedbyillsundergone,andthatmenhavebeenmovedbywhattheysuﬀertosearchoutnewandbettercoursesofactionistospeakveraciously.Thepreoccupationofexperiencewiththingswhicharecoming(arenowcoming,notjusttocome)isobvioustoanyonewhoseinterestinexperienceisempirical.Sinceweliveforward;sinceweliveinaworldwherechangesaregoingonwhoseissuemeansourwealorwoe;sinceeveryactofoursmodiﬁesthesechangesandhenceisfraughtwithpromise,orchargedwithhostileenergies—whatshouldexperiencebebutafutureimplicatedinapresent!Adjustmentisnotimelessstate;itisacontinuingprocess.Tosaythatachangetakestimemaybetosaysomethingabouttheeventwhichisexternalanduninstructive.Butadjustmentoforganismtoenvironmenttakestimeinthepregnantsense;everystepintheprocessisconditionedbyreferencetofurtherchangeswhichiteﬀects.Whatisgoingonintheenvironmentistheconcernoftheorganism;notwhatisalready“there”inaccomplishedandﬁnishedform.Insofarastheissueofwhatisgoingonmaybeaﬀectedbyinterventionoftheorganism,themovingeventisachallengewhichstretchestheagent-patienttomeetwhatiscoming.Experiencingexhibitsthingsintheirunterminatedaspectmovingtowarddeterminateconclusions.Theﬁnishedanddonewithisofimportas5
aﬀectingthefuture,notonitsownaccount:inshort,becauseitisnot,really,donewith.Anticipationisthereforemoreprimarythanrecollection;projectionthansummoningofthepast;theprospectivethantheretrospective.Givenaworldlikethatinwhichwelive,aworldinwhichenvironingchangesarepartlyfavorableandpartlycallouslyindiﬀerent,andexperienceisboundtobeprospectiveinimport;foranycontrolattainablebythelivingcreaturedependsuponwhatisdonetoalterthestateofthings.Successandfailurearetheprimary“categories”oflife;achievingofgoodandavertingofillareitssupremeinterests;hopeandanxiety(whicharenotself-enclosedstatesoffeeling,butactiveattitudesofwelcomeandwariness)aredominantqualitiesofexperience.Imaginativeforecastofthefutureisthisforerunningqualityofbehaviorrenderedavailableforguidanceinthepresent.Day-dreamingandcastle-buildingandestheticrealizationofwhatisnotpracticallyachievedareoﬀshootsofthispracticaltrait,orelsepracticalintelligenceisachastenedfantasy.Itmakeslittlediﬀerence.Imaginativerecoveryofthebygoneisindispensabletosuccessfulinvasionofthefuture,butitsstatusisthatofaninstrument.Toignoreitsimportisthesignofanundisciplinedagent;buttoisolatethepast,dwellinguponitforitsownsakeandgivingittheeulogisticnameofknowledge,istosubstitutethereminiscenceofold-ageforeﬀectiveintelligence.Themovementoftheagent-patienttomeetthefutureispartialandpassionate;yetdetachedandimpartialstudyofthepastistheonlyalternativetoluckinassuringsuccesstopassion.IIThisdescriptionofexperiencewouldbebutarhapsodiccelebrationofthecommonplacewereitnotinmarkedcontrasttoorthodoxphilosophicalaccounts.Thecontrastindicatesthattraditionalaccountshavenotbeenempirical,buthavebeendeductions,fromunnamedpremises,ofwhatexperiencemustbe.Historicempiricismhasbeenempiricalinatechnicalandcontroversialsense.Ithassaid,Lord,Lord,Experience,Experience;butinpracticeithasservedideasforcedintoexperience,notgatheredfromit.Theconfusionandartiﬁcialitytherebyintroducedintophilosophicalthoughtisnowheremoreevidentthanintheempiricaltreatmentofrelationsordynamiccontinuities.Theexperienceofalivingbeingstrugglingtoholditsownandmakeitswayinanenvironment,physicalandsocial,partlyfacilitatingandpartlyobstructingitsactions,isofnecessityamatteroftiesandconnexions,ofbearingsanduses.Theverypointofexperience,sotosay,isthatitdoesn’toccurinavacuum;itsagent-patientinsteadofbeinginsulatedanddisconnectedisboundupwiththemovementofthingsbymostintimateandpervasivebonds.Onlybecausetheorganismisinandoftheworld,anditsactivitiescorrelatedwiththoseofotherthingsinmultipleways,isitsusceptibletoundergoingthingsandcapableoftryingtoreduceobjectstomeansofsecuringitsgoodfortune.Thattheseconnexionsareofdiversekindsisirresistiblyprovedbytheﬂuctuationswhichoccurinitscareer.Helpandhindrance,stimulationandinhibition,success6
andfailuremeanspeciﬁcallydiﬀerentmodesofcorrelation.Althoughtheactionsofthingsintheworldaretakingplaceinonecontinuousstretchofexistence,thereareallkindsofspeciﬁcaﬃnities,repulsions,andrelativeindiﬀerencies.Dynamicconnexionsarequalitativelydiverse,justasarethecentersofaction.Inthissense,pluralism,notmonism,isanestablishedempiricalfact.Theattempttoestablishmonismfromconsiderationoftheverynatureofarelationisamerepieceofdialectics.EquallydialecticalistheeﬀorttoestablishbyaconsiderationofthenatureofrelationsanontologicalPluralismofUltimates:simpleandindependentbeings.Toattempttogetresultsfromaconsiderationofthe“external”natureofrelationsisofapiecewiththeattempttodeduceresultsfromtheir“internal”character.Somethingsarerelativelyinsulatedfromtheinﬂuenceofotherthings;somethingsareeasilyinvadedbyothers;somethingsareﬁercelyattractedtoconjointheiractivitieswiththoseofothers.Experienceexhibitseverykindofconnexion1fromthemostintimatetomereexternaljuxtaposition.Empirically,then,activebondsorcontinuitiesofallkinds,togetherwithstaticdiscontinuities,characterizeexistence.Todenythisqualitativeheterogeneityistoreducethestrugglesanddiﬃcultiesoflife,itscomediesandtragediestoillusion:tothenon-beingoftheGreeksortoitsmoderncounterpart,the“subjective.”Experienceisanaﬀairoffacilitationsandchecks,ofbeingsustainedanddisrupted,beingletalone,beinghelpedandtroubled,ofgoodfortuneanddefeatinallthecountlessqualitativemodeswhichthesewordspallidlysuggest.Theexistenceofgenuineconnexionsofallmannerofheterogeneitycannotbedoubted.Suchwordsasconjoining,disjoining,resisting,modifying,saltatory,andambulatory(touseJames’picturesqueterm)onlyhintattheiractualheterogeneity.Amongtherevisionsandsurrendersofhistoricproblemsdemandedbythisfeatureofempiricalsituations,thosecenteringintherationalistic-empiricalcontroversymaybeselectedforattention.Theimplicationsofthiscontroversyaretwofold:First,thatconnexionsareashomogeneousinfactasinname;and,secondly,ifgenuine,areallduetothought,or,ifempirical,arearbitraryby-productsofpastparticulars.Thestubbornparticularismoforthodoxem-piricismisitsoutstandingtrait;consequentlytheopposedrationalismfoundnojustiﬁcationofbearings,continuities,andtiessavetoreferthemingrosstotheworkofahyper-empiricalReason.Ofcourse,notallempiricismpriortoHumeandKantwassensationalistic,pulverizing“experience”intoisolatedsensoryqualitiesorsimpleideas.ItdidnotallfollowLocke’sleadinregardingtheentirecontentofgeneralizationasthe“workmanshipoftheunderstanding.”OntheContinent,priortoKant,philosopherswerecontenttodrawalinebetweenempiricalgeneralizations1Thewordrelationsuﬀersfromambiguity.Iamspeakinghereofconnexion,dynamicandfunctionalinteraction.“Relation”isatermusedalsotoexpresslogicalreference.Isuspectthatmuchofthecontroversyaboutinternalandexternalrelationsisduetothisambiguity.Onepassesatwillfromexistentialconnexionsofthingstologicalrelationshipofterms.Suchanidentiﬁcationofexistenceswithtermsiscongenialtoidealism,butisparadoxicalinaprofessedrealism.7
regardingmattersoffactandnecessaryuniversalsapplyingtotruthsofreason.Butlogicalatomismwasimpliciteveninthistheory.Statementsreferringtoempiricalfactweremerequantitativesummariesofparticularinstances.InthesensationalismwhichsprangfromHume(andwhichwasleftunquestionedbyKantasfarasanystrictlyempiricalelementwasconcerned)theimplicitparticularismwasmadeexplicit.Butthedoctrinethatsensationsandideasaresomanyseparateexistenceswasnotderivedfromobservationnorfromexperiment.Itwasalogicaldeductionfromapriorunexaminedconceptofthenatureofexperience.Fromthesameconceptitfollowedthattheappearanceofstableobjectsandofgeneralprinciplesofconnexionwasbutanappearance.2Kantianism,then,naturallyinvokeduniversalbondstorestoreobjectivity.But,insodoing,itacceptedtheparticularismofexperienceandproceededtosupplementitfromnon-empiricalsources.Asensorymanifoldbeingallwhichisreallyempiricalinexperience,areasonwhichtranscendsexperiencemustprovidesynthesis.Thenetoutcomemighthavesuggestedacorrectaccountofexperience.Forwehaveonlytoforgettheapparatusbywhichthenetoutcomeisarrivedat,tohavebeforeustheexperienceoftheplainman—adiversityofceaselesschangesconnectedinallkindsofways,staticanddynamic.Thisconclusionwoulddealadeathblowtobothempiricismandrationalism.For,makingclearthenon-empiricalcharacteroftheallegedmanifoldofunconnectedparticulars,itwouldrenderunnecessarytheappealtofunctionsoftheunderstandinginordertoconnectthem.Withthedownfallofthetraditionalnotionofexperience,theappealtoreasontosupplementitsdefectsbecomessuperﬂuous.Thetraditionwas,however,toostronglyentrenched;especiallyasitfurnishedthesubject-matterofanallegedscienceofstatesofmindwhichweredirectlyknownintheirverypresence.Thehistoricoutcomewasanewcropofartiﬁcialpuzzlesaboutrelations;itfasteneduponphilosophyforalongtimethequarrelabouttheaprioriandtheaposterioriasitschiefissue.Thecontroversyisto-dayquiescent.Yetitisnotatalluncommontoﬁndthinkersmodernintoneandintentwhoregardanyphilosophyofexperienceasnecessarilycommittedtodenialoftheexistenceofgenuinelygeneralpropositions,andwhotakeempiricismtobeinherentlyaversetotherecognitionoftheimportanceofanorganizingandconstructiveintelligence.Thequiescencealludedtoisinpartdue,Ithink,tosheerweariness.Butitisalsoduetoachangeofstandpointintroducedbybiologicalconceptions;andparticularlythediscoveryofbiologicalcontinuityfromthelowerorganismstoman.Forashortperiod,Spenceriansmightconnectthedoctrineofevolutionwiththeoldproblem,andusethelongtemporalaccumulationof“experiences”togeneratesomethingwhich,forhumanexperience,isapriori.ButthetendencyofthebiologicalwayofthinkingisneithertoconﬁrmornegatetheSpenceriandoctrine,buttoshifttheissue.Intheorthodoxpositionaposterioriandaprioriwereaﬀairsofknowledge.Butitsoonbecomesobviousthatwhilethere2Thereissomegaininsubstitutingadoctrineofﬂuxandinterpenetrationofpsychicalstates,àlaBergson,forthatofrigiddiscontinuity.Butthesubstitutionleavesuntouchedthefundamentalmisstatementofexperience,theconceptionofexperienceasdirectlyandprimarily“inner”andpsychical.8
isassuredlysomethingapriori—thatistosay,native,unlearned,original—inhumanexperience,thatsomethingisnotknowledge,butisactivitiesmadepossiblebymeansofestablishedconnexionsofneurones.Thisempiricalfactdoesnotsolvetheorthodoxproblem;itdissolvesit.Itshowsthattheproblemwasmisconceived,andsolutionsoughtbybothpartiesinthewrongdirection.Organicinstinctsandorganicretention,orhabit-forming,areundeniablefactorsinactualexperience.Theyarefactorswhicheﬀectorganizationandsecurecontinuity.Theyareamongthespeciﬁcfactswhichadescriptionofexperiencecognizantofthecorrelationoforganicactionwiththeactionofothernaturalobjectswillinclude.Butwhilefortunatelythecontributionofbiologicalsciencetoatrulyempiricaldescriptionofexperiencinghasoutlawedthediscussionoftheaprioriandaposteriori,thetransformingeﬀectofthesamecontributionsuponotherissueshasgoneunnoticed,saveaspragmatismhasmadeaneﬀorttobringthemtorecognition.IIIThepointseriouslyatissueinthenotionofexperiencecommontobothsidesintheoldercontroversythusturnsouttobetheplaceofthoughtorintelligenceinexperience.Doesreasonhaveadistinctiveoﬃce?Isthereacharacteristicorderofrelationscontributedbyit?Experience,toreturntoourpositiveconception,isprimarilywhatisundergoneinconnexionwithactivitieswhoseimportliesintheirobjectiveconsequences—theirbearinguponfutureexperiences.Organicfunctionsdealwiththingsasthingsincourse,inoperation,inastateofaﬀairsnotyetgivenorcompleted.Whatisdonewith,whatisjust“there,”isofconcernonlyinthepotentialitieswhichitmayindicate.Asended,aswhollygiven,itisofnoaccount.Butasasignofwhatmaycome,itbecomesanindispensablefactorinbehaviordealingwithchanges,theoutcomeofwhichisnotyetdetermined.Theonlypowertheorganismpossessestocontrolitsownfuturedependsuponthewayitspresentresponsesmodifychangeswhicharetakingplaceinitsmedium.Alivingbeingmaybecomparativelyimpotent,orcomparativelyfree.Itisallamatterofthewayinwhichitspresentreactionstothingsinﬂuencethefuturereactionsofthingsuponit.Withoutregardtoitswishorintenteveryactitperformsmakessomediﬀerenceintheenvironment.Thechangemaybetrivialasrespectsitsowncareerandfortune.Butitmayalsobeofincalculableimportance;itmayimportharm,destruction,oritmayprocurewell-being.Isitpossibleforalivingbeingtoincreaseitscontrolofwelfareandsuccess?Canitmanage,inanydegree,toassureitsfuture?Ordoestheamountofsecuritydependwhollyupontheaccidentsofthesituation?Canitlearn?Canitgainabilitytoassureitsfutureinthepresent?Thesequestionscenterattentionuponthesigniﬁcanceofreﬂectiveintelligenceintheprocessofexperience.Theextentofanagent’scapacityforinference,itspowertouseagivenfactasasignofsomethingnotyetgiven,measurestheextentofitsabilitysystematicallytoenlargeitscontrolofthefuture.9
Abeingwhichcanusegivenandﬁnishedfactsassignsofthingstocome;whichcantakegiventhingsasevidencesofabsentthings,can,inthatdegree,forecastthefuture;itcanformreasonableexpectations.Itiscapableofachievingideas;itispossessedofintelligence.Foruseofthegivenorﬁnishedtoanticipatetheconsequenceofprocessesgoingonispreciselywhatismeantby“ideas,”by“intelligence.”Aswehavealreadynoted,theenvironmentisrarelyallofakindinitsbearinguponorganicwelfare;itsmostwhole-heartedsupportoflife-activitiesisprecariousandtemporary.Someenvironmentalchangesareauspicious;othersaremenacing.Thesecretofsuccess—thatis,ofthegreatestattainablesuccess—isfortheorganicresponsetocastinitslotwithpresentauspiciouschangestostrengthenthemandthustoaverttheconsequencesﬂowingfromoccurrencesofill-omen.Anyreactionisaventure;itinvolvesrisk.Wealwaysbuildbetterorworsethanwecanforetell.Buttheorganism’sfatefulinterventioninthecourseofeventsisblind,itschoiceisrandom,exceptasitcanemploywhathappenstoitasabasisofinferringwhatislikelytohappenlater.Inthedegreeinwhichitcanreadfutureresultsinpresenton-goings,itsresponsivechoice,itspartialitytothisconditionorthat,becomeintelligent.Itsbiasgrowsreasonable.Itcandeliberately,intentionally,participateinthedirectionofthecourseofaﬀairs.Itsforesightofdiﬀerentfutureswhichresultaccordingasthisorthatpresentfactorpredominatesintheshapingofaﬀairspermitsittopartakeintelligentlyinsteadofblindlyandfatallyintheconsequencesitsreactionsgiveriseto.Participateitmust,andtoitsownwealorwoe.Inference,theuseofwhathappens,toanticipatewhatwill—oratleastmay—happen,makesthediﬀerencebetweendirectedandundirectedparticipation.Andthiscapacityforinferringispreciselythesameasthatuseofnaturaloccurrencesforthediscoveryanddeterminationofconsequences—theformationofnewdynamicconnexions—whichconstitutesknowledge.Thefactthatthoughtisanintrinsicfeatureofexperienceisfataltothetraditionalempiricismwhichmakesitanartiﬁcialby-product.Butforthatsamereasonitisfataltothehistoricrationalismswhosejustiﬁcationwasthesecondaryandretrospectivepositionassignedtothoughtbyempiricalphilosophy.Accordingtotheparticularismofthelatter,thoughtwasinevitablyonlyabunchingtogetherofhard-and-fastseparateitems;thinkingwasbutthegatheringtogetherandtyingofitemsalreadycompletelygiven,orelseanequallyartiﬁcialuntying—amechanicaladdingandsubtractingofthegiven.Itwasbutacumulativeregistration,aconsolidatedmerger;generalitywasamatterofbulk,notofquality.Thinkingwasthereforetreatedaslackingconstructivepower;evenitsorganizingcapacitywasbutsimulated,beingintruthbutarbitrarypigeon-holing.Genuineprojectionofthenovel,deliberatevariationandinvention,areidleﬁctionsinsuchaversionofexperience.Ifthereeverwascreation,italltookplaceataremoteperiod.Sincethentheworldhasonlyrecitedlessons.Thevalueofinventiveconstructionistooprecioustobedisposedofinthiscavalierway.Itsunceremoniousdenialaﬀordedanopportunitytoassertthatinadditiontoexperiencethesubjecthasaready-madefacultyofthoughtorreasonwhichtranscendsexperience.Rationalismthusacceptedtheaccount10
ofexperiencegivenbytraditionalempiricism,andintroducedreasonasextra-empirical.Therearestillthinkerswhoregardanyempiricismasnecessarilycommittedtoabeliefinacut-and-driedrelianceupondisconnectedprecedents,andwhoholdthatallsystematicorganizationofpastexperiencesfornewandconstructivepurposesisalientostrictempiricism.Rationalismneverexplained,however,howareasonextraneoustoexperiencecouldenterintohelpfulrelationwithconcreteexperiences.Bydeﬁnition,reasonandexperiencewereantithetical,sothattheconcernofreasonwasnotthefruitfulexpansionandguidanceofthecourseofexperience,butarealmofconsiderationstoosublimetotouch,orbetouchedby,experience.Discreetrationalistsconﬁnedthemselvestotheologyandalliedbranchesofabtrusescience,andtomathematics.Rationalismwouldhavebeenadoctrinereservedforacademicspecialistsandabstractformalistshaditnotassumedthetaskofprovidinganapologeticsfortraditionalmoralsandtheology,therebygettingintotouchwithactualhumanbeliefsandconcerns.Itisnotoriousthathistoricempiricismwasstrongincriticismandindemolitionofoutwornbeliefs,butweakforpurposesofconstructivesocialdirection.Butwefrequentlyoverlookthefactthatwheneverrationalismcutfreefromconservativeapologetics,itwasalsosimplyaninstrumentalityforpointingoutinconsistenciesandabsurditiesinexistingbeliefs—asphereinwhichitwasimmenselyuseful,astheEnlightenmentshows.LeibnizandVoltairewerecontemporaryrationalistsinmoresensesthanone.3Therecognitionthatreﬂectionisagenuinefactorwithinexperienceandanindispensablefactorinthatcontroloftheworldwhichsecuresaprosperousandsigniﬁcantexpansionofexperienceundermineshistoricrationalismasassuredlyasitabolishesthefoundationsofhistoricempiricism.Thebearingofacorrectideaoftheplaceandoﬃceofreﬂectionuponmodernidealismsislessobvious,butnolesscertain.Oneofthecuriositiesoforthodoxempiricismisthatitsoutstandingspecula-tiveproblemistheexistenceofan“externalworld.”Forinaccordancewiththenotionthatexperienceisattachedtoaprivatesubjectasitsexclusivepossession,aworldliketheoneinwhichweappeartolivemustbe“external”toexperienceinsteadofbeingitssubject-matter.Icallitacuriosity,forifanythingseemsadequatelygroundedempiricallyitistheexistenceofaworldwhichresiststhecharacteristicfunctionsofthesubjectofexperience;whichgoesitsway,insomerespects,independentlyofthesefunctions,andwhichfrustratesourhopesandintentions.Ignorancewhichisfatal;disappointment;theneedofadjustingmeansandendstothecourseofnature,wouldseemtobefactssuﬃcientlycharacterizingempiricalsituationsastorendertheexistenceofanexternalworldindubitable.Thatthedescriptionofexperiencewasarrivedatbyforcingactualempiricalfactsintoconformitywithdialecticdevelopmentsfromaconceptofaknoweroutsideoftherealworldofnatureistestiﬁedtobythehistoricallianceof3Mathematicalscienceinitsformalaspects,orasabranchofformallogic,hasbeentheempiricalstrongholdofrationalism.Butanempiricalempiricism,incontrastwithorthodoxdeductiveempiricism,hasnodiﬃcultyinestablishingitsjurisdictionastodeductivefunctions.11
empiricismandidealism.4Accordingtothemostlogicallyconsistenteditionsoforthodoxempiricism,allthatcanbeexperiencedistheﬂeeting,themomentary,mentalstate.Thataloneisabsolutelyandindubitablypresent;therefore,italoneiscognitivelycertain.Italoneisknowledge.Theexistenceofthepast(andofthefuture),ofadecentlystableworldandofotherselves—indeed,ofone’sownself—fallsoutsidethisdatumofexperience.Thesecanbearrivedatonlybyinferencewhichis“ejective”—anamegiventoanallegedtypeofinferencethatjumpsfromexperience,asfromaspringboard,tosomethingbeyondexperience.Ishouldnotanticipatediﬃcultyinshowingthatthisdoctrineis,dialectically,amassofinconsistencies.Avowedlyitisadoctrineofdesperation,andassuchitiscitedheretoshowthedesperatestraitstowhichignoringempiricalfactshasreducedadoctrineofexperience.Morepositivelyinstructivearetheobjectiveidealismswhichhavebeentheoﬀspringofthemarriagebetweenthe“reason”ofhistoricrationalismandtheallegedimmediatepsychicalstuﬀofhistoricempiricism.Theseidealismshaverecognizedthegenuinenessofconnexionsandtheimpotencyof“feeling.”Theyhavethenidentiﬁedconnexionswithlogicalorrationalconnexions,andthustreated“therealWorld”asasynthesisofsentientconsciousnessbymeansofarationalself-consciousnessintroducingobjectivity:stabilityanduniversalityofreference.Hereagain,forpresentpurposes,criticismisunnecessary.Itsuﬃcestopointoutthatthevalueofthistheoryisboundupwiththegenuinenessoftheproblemofwhichitpurportstobeasolution.Ifthebasicconceptisaﬁction,thereisnocallforthesolution.Themoreimportantpointistoperceivehowfarthe“thought”whichﬁguresinobjectiveidealismcomesfrommeetingtheempiricaldemandsmadeuponactualthought.Idealismismuchlessformalthanhistoricrationalism.Ittreatsthought,orreason,asconstitutiveofexperiencebymeansofunitingandconstructivefunctions,notasjustconcernedwitharealmofeternaltruthsapartfromexperience.Onsuchaviewthoughtcertainlylosesitsabstractnessandremoteness.But,unfortunately,inthusgainingthewholeworlditlosesitsownself.Aworldalready,initsintrinsicstructure,dominatedbythoughtisnotaworldinwhich,savebycontradictionofpremises,thinkinghasanythingtodo.Thatthedoctrinelogicallyresultsinmakingchangeunrealanderrorun-accountableareconsequencesofimportanceinthetechniqueofprofessionalphilosophy;inthedenialofempiricalfactwhichtheyimplytheyseemtomanyareductioadabsurdumofthepremisesfromwhichtheyproceed.But,afterall,suchconsequencesareofonlyprofessionalimport.Whatisserious,evensinister,istheimpliedsophisticationregardingtheplaceandoﬃceofreﬂectionintheschemeofthings.Adoctrinewhichexaltsthoughtinnamewhileignoringitseﬃcacyinfact(thatis,itsuseinbetteringlife)isadoctrinewhichcannotbeentertainedandtaughtwithoutseriousperil.Thosewhoarenotconcernedwithprofessionalphilosophybutwhoaresolicitousforintelligenceasafactor4Itisashametodevotethewordidealism,withitslatentmoral,practicalconnotations,toadoctrinewhosetenetsarethedenialoftheexistenceofaphysicalworld,andthepsychicalcharacterofallobjects–atleastasfarastheyareknowable.ButIamfollowingusage,notattemptingtomakeit.12
intheameliorationofactualconditionscanbutlookaskanceatanydoctrinewhichholdsthattheentireschemeofthingsisalready,ifwebutacquiretheknackoflookingatitaright,ﬁxedlyandcompletelyrational.Itisastrikingmanifestationoftheextentinwhichphilosophieshavebeencompensatoryinquality.5Butthemattercannotbepassedoverasifitweresimplyaquestionofnotgrudgingacertainamountofconsolationtooneamidtheirretrievableevilsoflife.Forastotheseevilsnooneknowshowmanyareretrievable;andaphilosophywhichproclaimstheabilityofadialectictheoryofknowledgetorevealtheworldasalreadyandeternallyaself-luminousrationalwhole,contaminatesthescopeanduseofthoughtatitsveryspring.Tosubstitutetheotioseinsightgainedbymanipulationofaformulafortheslowcoöperativeworkofahumanityguidedbyreﬂectiveintelligenceismorethanatechnicalblunderofspeculativephilosophers.ApracticalcrisismaythrowtherelationshipofideastolifeintoanexaggeratedBrocken-likespectralrelief,whereexaggerationrendersperceptiblefeaturesnotordinarilynoted.Theuseofforcetosecurenarrowbecauseexclusiveaimsisnonoveltyinhumanaﬀairs.Thedeployingofalltheintelligenceatcommandinordertoincreasetheeﬀectivenessoftheforceusedisnotsocommon,yetpresentsnothingintrinsicallyremarkable.Theidentiﬁcationofforce—military,economic,andadministrative—withmoralnecessityandmoralcultureis,however,aphenomenonnotlikelytoexhibititselfonawidescaleexceptwhereintelligencehasalreadybeensubornedbyanidealismwhichidentiﬁes“theactualwiththerational,”andthusﬁndsthemeasureofreasoninthebruteeventdeterminedbysuperiorforce.Ifwearetohaveaphilosophywhichwillintervenebetweenattachmenttoruleofthumbmuddlinganddevotiontoasystematizedsubordinationofintelligencetopreëxistentends,itcanbefoundonlyinaphilosophywhichﬁndstheultimatemeasureofintelligenceinconsiderationofadesirablefutureandinsearchforthemeansofbringingitprogressivelyintoexistence.Whenprofessedidealismturnsouttobeanarrowpragmatism—narrowbecausetakingforgrantedtheﬁnalityofendsdeterminedbyhistoricconditions—thetimehasarrivedforapragmatismwhichshallbeempiricallyidealistic,proclaimingtheessentialconnexionofintelligencewiththeunachievedfuture—withpossibilitiesinvolvingatransﬁguration.IVWhyhasthedescriptionofexperiencebeensoremotefromthefactsofempiricalsituations?Toanswerthisquestionthrowslightuponthesubmergenceofrecentphilosophizinginepistemology—thatis,indiscussionsofthenature,possibility,andlimitsofknowledgeingeneral,andintheattempttoreachconclusionsregardingtheultimatenatureofrealityfromtheanswersgiventosuchquestions.Thereplytothequeryregardingthecurrencyofanon-empiricaldoctrineofexperience(evenamongprofessedempiricists)isthatthetraditionalaccountisderivedfromaconceptiononceuniversallyentertainedregardingthesubjector5SeeDr.Kallen’sessay,below.13
bearerorcenterofexperience.Thedescriptionofexperiencehasbeenforcedintoconformitywiththispriorconception;ithasbeenprimarilyadeductionfromit,actualempiricalfactsbeingpouredintothemouldsofthedeductions.Thecharacteristicfeatureofthispriornotionistheassumptionthatexperiencecentersin,orgathersabout,orproceedsfromacenterorsubjectwhichisoutsidethecourseofnaturalexistence,andsetoveragainstit:—itbeingofnoimportance,forpresentpurposes,whetherthisantitheticalsubjectistermedsoul,orspirit,ormind,orego,orconsciousness,orjustknowerorknowingsubject.Thereareplausiblegroundsforthinkingthatthecurrencyoftheideainques-tionliesintheformwhichmen’sreligiouspreoccupationstookformanycenturies.Theseweredeliberatelyandsystematicallyother-worldly.TheycenteredaboutaFallwhichwasnotaneventinnature,butanaboriginalcatastrophethatcor-ruptedNature;aboutaredemptionmadepossiblebysupernaturalmeans;aboutalifeinanotherworld—essentially,notmerelyspatially,Other.Thesupremedramaofdestinytookplaceinasoulorspiritwhich,underthecircumstances,couldnotbeconceivedotherthanasnon-natural—extra-natural,ifnot,strictlyspeaking,supernatural.WhenDescartesandothersbrokeawayfrommedievalinterests,theyretainedascommonplacesitsintellectualapparatus:Suchas,knowledgeisexercisedbyapowerthatisextra-naturalandsetoveragainsttheworldtobeknown.Eveniftheyhadwishedtomakeacompletebreak,theyhadnothingtoputasknowerintheplaceofthesoul.Itmaybedoubtedwhethertherewasanyavailableempiricalsubstituteuntilscienceworkedoutthefactthatphysicalchangesarefunctionalcorrelationsofenergies,andthatmaniscontinuouswithotherformsoflife,anduntilsociallifehaddevelopedanintellectuallyfreeandresponsibleindividualasitsagent.Butmymainpointisnotdependentuponanyparticulartheoryastothehistoricoriginofthenotionaboutthebearerofexperience.Thepointisthereonitsownaccount.Theessentialthingisthatthebearerwasconceivedasoutsideoftheworld;sothatexperienceconsistedinthebearer’sbeingaﬀectedthroughatypeofoperationsnotfoundanywhereintheworld,whileknowledgeconsistsinsurveyingtheworld,lookingatit,gettingtheviewofaspectator.ThetheologicalproblemofattainingknowledgeofGodasultimaterealitywastransformedineﬀectintothephilosophicalproblemofthepossibilityofattainingknowledgeofreality.Forhowisonetogetbeyondthelimitsofthesubjectandsubjectiveoccurrences?Familiaritybreedscredulityoftenerthancontempt.Howcanaproblembeartiﬁcialwhenmenhavebeenbusydiscussingitalmostforthreehundredyears?Butiftheassumptionthatexperienceissomethingsetoveragainsttheworldiscontrarytofact,thentheproblemofhowselformindorsubjectiveexperienceorconsciousnesscanreachknowledgeofanexternalworldisassuredlyameaninglessproblem.Whateverquestionstheremaybeaboutknowledge,theywillnotbethekindofproblemswhichhaveformedepistemology.Theproblemofknowledgeasconceivedintheindustryofepistemologyistheproblemofknowledgeingeneral—ofthepossibility,extent,andvalidityofknowledgeingeneral.Whatdoesthis“ingeneral”mean?Inordinarylifethere14
areproblemsa-plentyofknowledgeinparticular;everyconclusionwetrytoreach,theoreticalorpractical,aﬀordssuchaproblem.Butthereisnoproblemofknowledgeingeneral.Idonotmean,ofcourse,thatgeneralstatementscannotbemadeaboutknowledge,orthattheproblemofattainingthesegeneralstatementsisnotagenuineone.Onthecontrary,speciﬁcinstancesofsuccessandfailureininquiryexist,andareofsuchacharacterthatonecandiscovertheconditionsconducingtosuccessandfailure.Statementoftheseconditionsconstituteslogic,andiscapableofbeinganimportantaidinproperguidanceoffurtherattemptsatknowing.Butthislogicalproblemofknowledgeisattheoppositepolefromtheepistemological.Speciﬁcproblemsareaboutrightconclusionstobereached—whichmeans,ineﬀect,rightwaysofgoingaboutthebusinessofinquiry.Theyimplyadiﬀerencebetweenknowledgeanderrorconsequentuponrightandwrongmethodsofinquiryandtesting;notadiﬀerencebetweenexperienceandtheworld.Theproblemofknowledgeüberhauptexistsbecauseitisassumedthatthereisaknoweringeneral,whoisoutsideoftheworldtobeknown,andwhoisdeﬁnedintermsantitheticaltothetraitsoftheworld.Withanalogousassumptions,wecouldinventanddiscussaproblemofdigestioningeneral.Allthatwouldberequiredwouldbetoconceivethestomachandfood-materialasinhabitingdiﬀerentworlds.Suchanassumptionwouldleaveonourhandsthequestionofthepossibility,extent,nature,andgenuinenessofanytransactionbetweenstomachandfood.Butbecausethestomachandfoodinhabitacontinuousstretchofexistence,becausedigestionisbutacorrelationofdiverseactivitiesinoneworld,theproblemsofdigestionarespeciﬁcandplural:Whataretheparticularcorrelationswhichconstituteit?Howdoesitproceedindiﬀerentsituations?Whatisfavorableandwhatunfavorabletoitsbestperformance?—andsoon.Canonedenythatifweweretotakeourcluefromthepresentempiricalsituation,includingthescientiﬁcnotionofevolution(biologicalcontinuity)andtheexistingartsofcontrolofnature,subjectandobjectwouldbetreatedasoccupyingthesamenaturalworldasunhesitatinglyasweassumethenaturalconjunctionofananimalanditsfood?Woulditnotfollowthatknowledgeisonewayinwhichnaturalenergiescoöperate?Wouldtherebeanyproblemsavediscoveryofthepeculiarstructureofthiscoöperation,theconditionsunderwhichitoccurstobesteﬀect,andtheconsequenceswhichissuefromitsoccurrence?Itisacommonplacethatthechiefdivisionsofmodernphilosophy,idealisminitsdiﬀerentkinds,realismsofvariousbrands,so-calledcommon-sensedualism,agnosticism,relativism,phenomenalism,havegrownuparoundtheepistemolog-icalproblemofthegeneralrelationofsubjectandobject.Problemsnotopenlyepistemological,suchaswhethertherelationofchangesinconsciousnesstophysicalchangesisoneofinteraction,parallelism,orautomatismhavethesameorigin.Whatbecomesofphilosophy,consistinglargelyasitdoesofdiﬀerentanswerstothesequestions,incasetheassumptionswhichgeneratethequestionshavenoempiricalstanding?Isitnottimethatphilosophersturnedfromtheattempttodeterminethecomparativemeritsofvariousrepliestothequestionstoaconsiderationoftheclaimsofthequestions?Whendominatingreligiousideaswerebuiltupabouttheideathattheself15
isastrangerandpilgriminthisworld;whenmorals,fallinginline,foundtruegoodonlyininnerstatesofaselfinaccessibletoanythingbutitsownprivateintrospection;whenpoliticaltheoryassumedtheﬁnalityofdisconnectedandmutuallyexclusivepersonalities,thenotionthatthebearerofexperienceisantitheticaltotheworldinsteadofbeinginandofitwascongenial.Itatleasthadthewarrantofotherbeliefsandaspirations.Butthedoctrineofbiologicalcontinuityororganicevolutionhasdestroyedthescientiﬁcbasisoftheconception.Morally,menarenowconcernedwiththeameliorationoftheconditionsofthecommonlotinthisworld.Socialsciencesrecognizethatassociatedlifeisnotamatterofphysicaljuxtaposition,butofgenuineintercourse—ofcommunityofexperienceinanon-metaphoricalsenseofcommunity.Whyshouldwelongertrytopatchupandreﬁneandstretchtheoldsolutionstilltheyseemtocoverthechangeofthoughtandpractice?Whynotrecognizethatthetroubleiswiththeproblem?Abeliefinorganicevolutionwhichdoesnotextendunreservedlytothewayinwhichthesubjectofexperienceisthoughtof,andwhichdoesnotstrivetobringtheentiretheoryofexperienceandknowingintolinewithbiologicalandsocialfacts,ishardlymorethanPickwickian.Therearemany,forexample,whoholdthatdreams,hallucinations,anderrorscannotbeaccountedforatallexceptonthetheorythataself(or“consciousness”)exercisesamodifyinginﬂuenceuponthe“realobject.”Thelogicalassumptionisthatconsciousnessisoutsideoftherealobject;thatitissomethingdiﬀerentinkind,andthereforehasthepowerofchanging“reality”intoappearance,ofintroducing“relativities”intothingsastheyareinthemselves—inshort,ofinfectingrealthingswithsubjectivity.Suchwritersseemunawareofthefactthatthisassumptionmakesconsciousnesssupernaturalintheliteralsenseoftheword;andthat,tosaytheleast,theconceptioncanbeacceptedbyonewhoacceptsthedoctrineofbiologicalcontinuityonlyaftereveryotherwayofdealingwiththefactshasbeenexhausted.Realists,ofcourse(atleastsomeoftheNeo-realists),denyanysuchmiraculousinterventionofconsciousness.Butthey6admittherealityoftheproblem;denyingonlythisparticularsolution,theytrytoﬁndsomeotherwayout,whichwillstillpreserveintactthenotionofknowledgeasarelationshipofageneralsortbetweensubjectandobject.Nowdreamsandhallucinations,errors,pleasures,andpains,possibly“sec-ondary”qualities,donotoccursavewherethereareorganiccentersofexperience.Theyclusteraboutasubject.Buttotreatthemasthingswhichinhereexclu-sivelyinthesubject;orasposingtheproblemofadistortionoftherealobjectbyaknowersetoveragainsttheworld,oraspresentingfactstobeexplainedprimarilyascasesofcontemplativeknowledge,istotestifythatonehasstilltolearnthelessonofevolutioninitsapplicationtotheaﬀairsinhand.Ifbiologicaldevelopmentbeaccepted,thesubjectofexperienceisatleastananimal,continuouswithotherorganicformsinaprocessofmorecomplex6The“they”meansthe“some”ofthepriorsentence–thosewhoserealismisepistemological,insteadofbeingapleafortakingthefactsofexperienceasweﬁndthemwithoutrefractionthroughepistemologicalapparatus.16
organization.Ananimalinturnisatleastcontinuouswithchemico-physicalprocesseswhich,inlivingthings,aresoorganizedasreallytoconstitutetheactivitiesoflifewithalltheirdeﬁningtraits.Andexperienceisnotidenticalwithbrainaction;itistheentireorganicagent-patientinallitsinteractionwiththeenvironment,naturalandsocial.Thebrainisprimarilyanorganofacertainkindofbehavior,notofknowingtheworld.Andtorepeatwhathasalreadybeensaid,experiencingisjustcertainmodesofinteraction,ofcorrelation,ofnaturalobjectsamongwhichtheorganismhappens,sotosay,tobeone.Itfollowswithequalforcethatexperiencemeansprimarilynotknowledge,butwaysofdoingandsuﬀering.Knowingmustbedescribedbydiscoveringwhatparticularmode—qualitativelyunique—ofdoingandsuﬀeringitis.Asitis,weﬁndexperienceassimilatedtoanon-empiricalconceptofknowledge,derivedfromanantecedentnotionofaspectatoroutsideoftheworld.7Inshort,theepistemologicalfashionofconceivingdreams,errors,“relativities,”etc.,dependsupontheisolationofmindfromintimateparticipationwithotherchangesinthesamecontinuousnexus.Thusitislikecontendingthatwhenabottlebursts,thebottleis,insomeself-containedmiraculousway,exclusivelyresponsible.Sinceitisthenatureofabottletobewholesoastoretainﬂuids,burstingisanabnormalevent—comparabletoanhallucination.Henceitcannotbelongtothe“real”bottle;the“subjectivity”ofglassisthecause.Itisobviousthatsincethebreakingofglassisacaseofspeciﬁccorrelationofnaturalenergies,itsaccidentalandabnormalcharacterhastodowithconsequences,notwithcausation.Accidentisinterferencewiththeconsequencesforwhichthebottleisintended.Theburstingconsideredapartfromitsbearingontheseconsequencesisonaplanewithanyotheroccurrenceinthewideworld.Butfromthestandpointofadesiredfuture,burstingisananomaly,aninterruptionofthecourseofevents.Theanalogywiththeoccurrenceofdreams,hallucinations,etc.,seemstomeexact.Dreamsarenotsomethingoutsideoftheregularcourseofevents;theyareinandofit.Theyarenotcognitivedistortionsofrealthings;theyaremorerealthings.Thereisnothingabnormalintheirexistence,anymorethanthereisintheburstingofabottle.8Buttheymaybeabnormal,fromthestandpointoftheirinﬂuence,oftheiroperationasstimuliincallingoutresponsestomodifythefuture.Dreamshaveoftenbeentakenasprognosticsofwhatistohappen;theyhavemodiﬁedconduct.Ahallucinationmayleadamantoconsultadoctor;suchaconsequenceisrightandproper.Buttheconsultationindicatesthat7Itisinterestingtonotethatsomeoftherealistswhohaveassimilatedthecognitiverelationtootherexistentialrelationsintheworld(insteadoftreatingitasanuniqueorepistemologicalrelation)havebeenforcedinsupportoftheirconceptionofknowledgeasa“presentative”orspectatorialaﬀairtoextendthedeﬁningfeaturesofthelattertoallrelationsamongthings,andhencetomakeallthe“real”thingsintheworldpure“simples,”whollyindependentofoneanother.Soconceivedthedoctrineofexternalrelationsappearstoberatherthedoctrineofcompleteexternalityofthings.Asidefromthispoint,thedoctrineisinterestingforitsdialecticalingenuityandfortheelegantdevelopmentofassumedpremises,ratherthanconvincingonaccountofempiricalevidencesupportingit.8Inotherwords,thereisageneral“problemoferror”onlybecausethereisageneralproblemofevil,concerningwhichseeDr.Kallen’sessay,below.17
thesubjectregardeditasanindicationofconsequenceswhichhefeared:asasymptomofadisturbedlife.Orthehallucinationmayleadhimtoanticipateconsequenceswhichinfactﬂowonlyfromthepossessionofgreatwealth.Thenthehallucinationisadisturbanceofthenormalcourseofevents;theoccurrenceiswronglyusedwithreferencetoeventualities.Toregardreferencetouseandtodesiredandintendedconsequencesasinvolvinga“subjective”factoristomissthepoint,forthishasregardtothefuture.Theusestowhichabottleareputarenotmental;theydonotconsistofphysicalstates;theyarefurthercorrelationsofnaturalexistences.Consequencesinusearegenuinenaturalevents;buttheydonotoccurwithouttheinterventionofbehaviorinvolvinganticipationofafuture.Thecaseisnototherwisewithanhallucination.Thediﬀerencesitmakesareinanycasediﬀerencesinthecourseoftheonecontinuousworld.Theimportantpointiswhethertheyaregoodorbaddiﬀerences.Tousethehallucinationasasignoforganiclesionsthatmenacehealthmeansthebeneﬁcialresultofseeingaphysician;torespondtoitasasignofconsequencessuchasactuallyfollowonlyfrombeingpersecutedistofallintoerror—tobeabnormal.Thepersecutorsare“unreal”;thatis,therearenothingswhichactaspersecutorsact;butthehallucinationexists.Givenitsconditionsitisasnaturalasanyotherevent,andposesonlythesamekindofproblemasisputbytheoccurrenceof,say,athunderstorm.The“unreality”ofpersecutionisnot,however,asubjectivematter;itmeansthatconditionsdonotexistforproducingthefutureconsequenceswhicharenowanticipatedandreactedto.Abilitytoanticipatefutureconsequencesandtorespondtothemasstimulitopresentbehaviormaywelldeﬁnewhatismeantbyamindorby“consciousness.”9Butthisisonlyawayofsayingjustwhatkindofarealornaturalexistencethesubjectis;itisnottofallbackonapreconceptionaboutanunnaturalsubjectinordertocharacterizetheoccurrenceoferror.Althoughthediscussionmaybealreadylabored,letustakeanotherexample—theoccurrenceofdisease.Bydeﬁnitionitispathological,abnormal.Atonetimeinhumanhistorythisabnormalitywastakentobesomethingdwellingintheintrinsicnatureoftheevent—initsexistenceirrespectiveoffutureconsequences.Diseasewasliterallyextra-naturalandtobereferredtodemons,ortomagic.Nooneto-dayquestionsitsnaturalness—itsplaceintheorderofnaturalevents.Yetitisabnormal—foritoperatestoeﬀectresultsdiﬀerentfromthosewhichfollowfromhealth.Thediﬀerenceisagenuineempiricaldiﬀerence,notamerementaldistinction.Fromthestandpointofbearingonasubsequentcourseofeventsdiseaseisunnatural,inspiteofthenaturalnessofitsoccurrenceandorigin.Thehabitofignoringreferencetothefutureisresponsiblefortheassumptionthattoadmithumanparticipationinanyformistoadmitthe“subjective”inasensewhichalterstheobjectiveintothephenomenal.Therehavebeenthosewho,likeSpinoza,regardedhealthanddisease,goodandill,asequallyrealandequallyunreal.However,onlyafewconsistentmaterialistshaveincludedtruthalongwitherrorasmerelyphenomenalandsubjective.Butifonedoes9ComparethepaperbyProfessorBode.18
notregardmovementtowardpossibleconsequencesasgenuine,wholesaledenialofexistentialvaliditytoallthesedistinctionsistheonlylogicalcourse.Toselecttruthasobjectiveanderroras“subjective”is,onthisbasis,anunjustiﬁablypartialprocedure.Takeeverythingasﬁxedlygiven,andbothtruthanderrorarearbitraryinsertionsintofact.Admitthegenuinenessofchangesgoingon,andcapacityforitsdirectionthroughorganicactionbasedonforesight,andbothtruthandfalsityarealikeexistential.Itishumantoregardthecourseofeventswhichisinlinewithourowneﬀortsastheregularcourseofevents,andinterruptionsasabnormal,butthispartialityofhumandesireisitselfapartofwhatactuallytakesplace.Itisnowproposedtotakeaparticularcaseoftheallegedepistemologicalpredicamentfordiscussion,sincetheentiregroundcannotbecovered.Ithink,however,theinstancechosenistypical,sothattheconclusionreachedmaybegeneralized.Theinstanceisthatofso-calledrelativityinperception.Therearealmostendlessinstances;thestickbentinwater;thewhistlechangingpitchwithchangeofdistancefromtheear;objectsdoubledwhentheeyeispushed;thedestroyedstarstillvisible,etc.,etc.Forourconsiderationwemaytakethecaseofasphericalobjectthatpresentsitselftooneobserverasaﬂatcircle,toanotherasasomewhatdistortedellipticalsurface.Thissituationgivesempiricalproof,soitisargued,ofthediﬀerencebetweenarealobjectandmereappearance.Sincethereisbutoneobject,theexistenceoftwosubjectsisthesolediﬀerentiatingfactor.Hencethetwoappearancesoftheonerealobjectisproofoftheinterveningdistortingactionofthesubject.AndmanyoftheNeo-realistswhodenythediﬀerenceinquestion,admitthecasetobeoneofknowledgeandaccordinglytoconstituteanepistemologicalproblem.Theyhaveinconsequencedevelopedwonderfullyelaborateschemesofsundrykindstomaintain“epistemologicalmonism”intact.Letustrytokeepclosetoempiricalfacts.Intheﬁrstplacethetwounlikeappearancesoftheonespherearephysicallynecessarybecauseofthelawsofreactionoflight.Iftheonespheredidnotassumethesetwoappearancesundergivenconditions,weshouldbeconfrontedwithahopelesslyirreconcilablediscrepancyinthebehaviorofnaturalenergy.Thattheresultisnaturalisevidencedbythefactthattwocameras—orotherarrangementsofapparatusforreﬂectinglight—yieldpreciselythesameresults.Photographsareasgenuinelyphysicalexistencesastheoriginalsphere;andtheyexhibitthetwogeometricalforms.Thestatementofthesefactsmakesnoimpressionupontheconﬁrmedepis-temologist;hemerelyretortsthataslongasitisadmittedthattheorganismisthecauseofaspherebeingseen,fromdiﬀerentpoints,asacircularandasanellipticalsurface,theessenceofhiscontention—themodiﬁcationoftherealobjectbythesubject—isadmitted.Tothequestionwhythesamelogicdoesnotapplytophotographicrecordshemakes,asfarasIknow,noreplyatall.Thesourceofthediﬃcultyisnothardtosee.Theobjectionassumesthattheallegedmodiﬁcationsoftherealobjectarecasesofknowingandhenceattributabletotheinﬂuenceofaknower.Statementswhichsetforththedoctrine19
willalwaysbefoundtorefertotheorganicfactor,totheeye,asanobserverorapercipient.Evenwhenreferenceismadetoalensoramirror,languageissometimesusedwhichsuggeststhatthewriter’snaïvetéissuﬃcientlygrosstotreatthesephysicalfactorsasiftheywereengagedinperceivingthesphere.Butasitisevidentthatthelensoperatesasaphysicalfactorincorrelationwithotherphysicalfactors—notablylight—soitoughttobeevidentthattheinterventionoftheopticalapparatusoftheeyeisapurelynon-cognitivematter.Therelationinquestionisnotonebetweenasphereandawould-beknowerofit,unfortunatelycondemnedbythenatureoftheknowingapparatustoalterthethinghewouldknow;itisanaﬀairofthedynamicinteractionoftwophysicalagentsinproducingathirdthing,aneﬀect;—anaﬀairofpreciselythesamekindasinanyphysicalconjointaction,saytheoperationofhydrogenandoxygeninproducingwater.Toregardtheeyeasprimarilyaknower,anobserver,ofthings,isascrassastoassignthatfunctiontoacamera.Butunlesstheeye(oropticalapparatus,orbrain,ororganism)besoregarded,thereisabsolutelynoproblemofobservationorofknowledgeinthecaseoftheoccurrenceofellipticalandcircularsurfaces.Knowledgedoesnotenterintotheaﬀairatalltillaftertheseformsofrefractedlighthavebeenproduced.Aboutthemthereisnothingunreal.Lightisreally,physically,existentially,refractedintotheseforms.Ifthesamesphericalformuponrefractinglighttophysicalobjectsintwoquitediﬀerentpositionsproducedthesamegeometricforms,therewould,indeed,besomethingtomarvelat—astherewouldbeifwaxproducedthesameresultsincontactsimultaneouslywithacoldbodyandwithawarmone.Whytalkabouttherealobjectinrelationtoaknowerwhenwhatisgivenisonerealthingindynamicconnectionwithanotherrealthing?Thewayofdealingwiththecasewillprobablymeetwitharetort;atleast,ithasdonesobefore.Ithasbeensaidthattheaccountgivenaboveandtheaccountoftraditionalsubjectivismdiﬀeronlyverbally.Theessentialthinginboth,soitissaid,istheadmissionthatanactivityofaselforsubjectororganismmakesadiﬀerenceintherealobject.Whetherthesubjectmakesthisdiﬀerenceintheveryprocessofknowingormakesitpriortotheactofknowingisaminormatter;whatisimportantisthattheknownthinghas,bythetimeitisknown,been“subjectiﬁed.”Theobjectiongivesaconvenientoccasionforsummarizingthemainpointsoftheargument.Ontheonehand,theretortoftheobjectordependsupontalkingabouttherealobject.Employtheterm“arealobject,”andthechangeproducedbytheactivitycharacteristicoftheopticalapparatusisofjustthesamekindasthatofthecameralensorthatofanyotherphysicalagency.Everyeventintheworldmarksadiﬀerencemadetooneexistenceinactiveconjunctionwithsomeotherexistence.And,asfortheallegedsubjectivity,ifsubjectiveisusedmerelyasanadjectivetodesignatethespeciﬁcactivityofaparticularexistence,comparable,say,tothetermferal,appliedtotiger,ormetallic,appliedtoiron,thenofcoursereferencetosubjectiveislegitimate.Butitisalsotautological.Itislikesayingthatﬂesheatersarecarnivorous.Buttheterm“subjective”issoconsecratedtootheruses,usuallyimplyinginvidiouscontrastwithobjectivity(whilesubjectiveinthesensejustsuggestedmeans20
speciﬁcmodeofobjectivity),thatitisdiﬃculttomaintainthisinnocentsense.Itsuseinanydisparagingwayinthesituationbeforeus—anysenseimplicatingcontrastwitharealobject—assumesthattheorganismoughtnottomakeanydiﬀerencewhenitoperatesinconjunctionwithotherthings.Thusweruntoearththatassumptionthatthesubjectisheterogeneousfromeveryothernaturalexistence;itistobetheoneotiose,inoperativethinginamovingworld—ouroldassumptionoftheselfasoutsideofthings.10Whatandwhereisknowledgeinthecasewehavebeenconsidering?Not,aswehavealreadyseen,intheproductionofformsoflighthavingacircularandellipticalsurface.Theseformsarenaturalhappenings.Theymayenterintoknowledgeortheymaynot,accordingtocircumstances.Countlesssuchrefractivechangestakeplacewithoutbeingnoted.11Whentheybecomesubject-matterforknowledge,theinquirytheysetonfootmaytakeonanindeﬁnitevarietyofforms.Onemaybeinterestedinascertainingmoreaboutthestructuralpeculiaritiesoftheformsthemselves;onemaybeinterestedinthemechanismoftheirproduction;onemayﬁndproblemsinprojectivegeometry,orindrawingandpainting—alldependinguponthespeciﬁcmatter-of-factcontext.Theformsmaybeobjectivesofknowledge—ofreﬂectiveexamination—ortheymaybemeansofknowingsomethingelse.Itmayhappen—undersomecircumstancesitdoeshappen—thattheobjectiveofinquiryisthenatureofthegeometricformwhich,whenrefractinglight,givesrisetotheseotherforms.Inthiscasethesphereisthethingknown,andinthiscase,theformsoflightaresignsorevidenceoftheconclusiontobedrawn.Thereisnomorereasonforsupposingthattheyare(mis)knowledgesofthesphere—thatthesphereisnecessarilyandfromthestartwhatoneistryingtoknow—thanforsupposingthatthepositionofthemercuryinthethermometertubeisacognitivedistortionofatmosphericpressure.Ineachcase(thatofthemercuryandthatof,say,acircularsurface)theprimarydatumisaphysicalhappening.Ineachcaseitmaybeused,uponoccasion,asasignorevidenceofthenatureofthecauseswhichbroughtitabout.Giventhepositioninquestion,thecircularformwouldbeanintrinsicallyunreliableevidenceofthenatureandpositionofthesphericalbodyonlyincaseit,asthedirectdatumofperception,werenotwhatitis—acircularform.Iconfessthatallthisseemssoobviousthatthereaderisentitledtoinquireintothemotiveforrecitingsuchplainfacts.Wereitnotforthepersistenceoftheepistemologicalproblemitwouldbeanaﬀronttothereader’sintelligencetodwelluponthem.Butaslongassuchfactsaswehavebeendiscussingfurnishthesubject-matterwithwhichphilosophizingispeculiarlyconcerned,these10AstheattempttoretaintheepistemologicalproblemandyettorejectidealisticandrelativisticsolutionshasforcedsomeNeo-realistsintothedoctrineofisolatedandindependentsimples,soithasalsoledtoadoctrineofEleaticpluralism.Inordertomaintainthedoctrinethesubjectmakesnodiﬀerencetoanythingelse,itisheldthatnoultimaterealmakesanydiﬀerencetoanythingelse–allthisratherthansurrenderonceforallthegenuinenessoftheproblemandtofollowtheleadofempiricalsubject-matter.11Thereisalmostnoendtothevariousdialecticdevelopmentsoftheepistemologicalsituation.Whenitisheldthatalltherelationsofthetypeinquestionarecognitive,andyetitisrecognized(asitmustbe)thatmanysuch“transformations”gounremarked,thetheoryissupplementedbyintroducing“unconscious”psychicalmodiﬁcations.21
commonplacesmustbeurgedandreiterated.Theybearouttwocontentionswhichareimportantatthejuncture,althoughtheywilllosespecialsigniﬁcanceassoonasthesearehabituallyrecognized:Negatively,apriorandnon-empiricalnotionoftheselfisthesourceoftheprevailingbeliefthatexperienceassuchisprimarilycognitional—aknowledgeaﬀair;positively,knowledgeisalwaysamatteroftheusethatismadeofexperiencednaturalevents,auseinwhichgiventhingsaretreatedasindicationsofwhatwillbeexperiencedunderdiﬀerentconditions.Letusmakeoneeﬀortmoretoclearupthesepoints.Supposeitisaquestionofknowledgeofwater.Thethingtobeknowndoesnotpresentitselfprimarilyasamatterofknowledge-and-ignoranceatall.Itoccursasastimulustoactionandasthesourceofcertainundergoings.Itissomethingtoreactto:—todrink,towashwith,toputoutﬁrewith,andalsosomethingthatreactsunexpectedlytoourreactions,thatmakesusundergodisease,suﬀocation,drowning.Inthistwofoldway,wateroranythingelseentersintoexperience.Suchpresenceinexperiencehasofitselfnothingtodowithknowledgeorconsciousness;nothingthatisinthesenseofdependinguponthem,thoughithaseverythingtodowithknowledgeandconsciousnessinthesensethatthelatterdependsuponpriorexperienceofthisnon-cognitivesort.Man’sexperienceiswhatitisbecausehisresponsetothings(evensuccessfulresponse)andthereactionsofthingstohislife,aresoradicallydiﬀerentfromknowledge.Thediﬃcultiesandtragediesoflife,thestimulitoacquiringknowledge,lieintheradicaldisparityofpresence-in-experienceandpresence-in-knowing.Yettheimmenseimportanceofknowledgeexperience,thefactthatturningpresence-in-experienceoverintopresence-in-a-knowledge-experienceisthesolemodeofcontrolofnature,hassystematicallyhypnotizedEuropeanphilosophysincethetimeofSocratesintothinkingthatallexperiencingisamodeofknowing,ifnotgoodknowledge,thenalow-gradeorconfusedorimplicitknowledge.Whenwaterisanadequatestimulustoactionorwhenitsreactionsoppressandoverwhelmus,itremainsoutsidethescopeofknowledge.When,however,thebarepresenceofthething(say,asopticalstimulus)ceasestooperatedirectlyasstimulustoresponseandbeginstooperateinconnectionwithaforecastoftheconsequencesitwilleﬀectwhenrespondedto,itbeginstoacquiremeaning—tobeknown,tobeanobject.Itisnotedassomethingwhichiswet,ﬂuid,satisﬁesthirst,allaysuneasiness,etc.Theconceptionthatwebeginwithaknownvisualqualitywhichisthereafterenlargedbyaddingonqualitiesapprehendedbytheothersensesdoesnotrestuponexperience;itrestsuponmakingexperienceconformtothenotionthateveryexperiencemustbeacognitivenoting.Aslongasthevisualstimulusoperatesasastimulusonitsownaccount,thereisnoapprehension,nonoting,ofcolororlightatall.Tomuchthegreaterportionofsensorystimuliwereactinpreciselythiswhollynon-cognitiveway.Intheattitudeofsuspendedresponseinwhichconsequencesareanticipated,thedirectstimulusbecomesasignorindexofsomethingelse—andthusmatterofnotingorapprehensionoracquaintance,orwhatevertermmaybeemployed.Thisdiﬀerence(together,ofcourse,withtheconsequenceswhichgowithit)isthediﬀerencewhichthenaturaleventofknowingmakestothenaturaleventofdirect22
organicstimulation.Itisnochangeofarealityintoanunreality,ofanobjectintosomethingsubjective;itisnosecret,illicit,orepistemologicaltransformation;itisagenuineacquisitionofnewanddistinctivefeaturesthroughenteringintorelationswiththingswithwhichitwasnotformerlyconnected—namely,possibleandfuturethings.But,repliessomeonesoobsessedwiththeepistemologicalpointofviewthatheassumesthattheprioraccountisarivalepistemologyindisguise,allthisinvolvesnochangeinReality,nodiﬀerencemadetoReality.Waterwasallthetimeallthethingsitiseverfoundouttobe.Itsrealnaturehasnotbeenalteredbyknowingit;anysuchalterationmeansamis-knowing.Inreplyletitbesaid,—oncemoreandﬁnally,—thereisnoassertionorimplicationabouttherealobjectortherealworldorthereality.Suchanassumptiongoeswiththatepistemologicaluniverseofdiscoursewhichhastobeabandonedinanempiricaluniverseofdiscourse.Thechangeisofarealobject.Anincidentoftheworldoperatingasaphysiologicallydirectstimulusisassuredlyareality.Respondedto,itproducesspeciﬁcconsequencesinvirtueoftheresponse.Waterisnotdrunkunlesssomebodydrinksit;itdoesnotquenchthirstunlessathirstypersondrinksit—andsoon.Consequencesoccurwhetheroneisawareofthemornot;theyareintegralfactsinexperience.Butletoneoftheseconsequencesbeanticipatedandletit,asanticipated,becomeanindispensableelementinthestimulus,andthenthereisaknownobject.Itisnotthatknowingproducesachange,butthatitisachangeofthespeciﬁckinddescribed.Aserialprocess,thesuccessiveportionsofwhichareassuchincapableofsimultaneousoccurrence,istelescopedandcondensedintoanobject,auniﬁedinter-referenceofcontemporaneousproperties,mostofwhichexpresspotentialitiesratherthancompleteddata.Becauseofthischange,anobjectpossessestruthorerror(whichthephysicaloccurrenceassuchneverhas);itisclassiﬁableasfactorfantasy;itisofasortorkind,expressesanessenceornature,possessesimplications,etc.,etc.Thatistosay,itismarkedbyspeciﬁablelogicaltraitsnotfoundinphysicaloccurrencesassuch.BecauseobjectiveidealismshaveseizeduponthesetraitsasconstitutingtheveryessenceofRealityisnoreasonforproclaimingthattheyareready-madefeaturesofphysicalhappenings,andhenceformaintainingthatknowingisnothingbutanappearanceofthingsonastageforwhich“consciousness”suppliesthefootlights.Foronlytheepistemologicalpredicamentleadsto“presentations”beingregardedascognitionsofthingswhichwerepreviouslyunpresented.Inanyempiricalsituationofeverydaylifeorofscience,knowledgesigniﬁessomethingstatedorinferredofanotherthing.VisiblewaterisnotamorelesserroneouspresentationofH_{2}O,butH_{2}Oisaknowledgeaboutthethingwesee,drink,washwith,sailon,anduseforpower.Afurtherpointandthepresentphaseofdiscussionterminates.Treatingknowledgeasapresentativerelationbetweentheknowerandobjectmakesitnecessarytoregardthemechanismofpresentationasconstitutingtheactofknowing.Sincethingsmaybepresentedinsense-perception,inrecollection,inimaginationandinconception,andsincethemechanismineveryoneofthesefourstylesofpresentationissensory-cerebraltheproblemofknowingbecomes23
amind-bodyproblem.12Thepsychological,orphysiological,mechanismofpresentationinvolvedinseeingachair,rememberingwhatIateyesterdayforluncheon,imaginingthemoonthesizeofacartwheel,conceivingamathematicalcontinuumisidentiﬁedwiththeoperationofknowing.Theevilconsequencesaretwofold.Theproblemoftherelationofmindandbodyhasbecomeapartoftheproblemofthepossibilityofknowledgeingeneral,tothefurthercomplicationofamatteralreadyhopelesslyconstrained.Meantimetheactualprocessofknowing,namely,operationsofcontrolledobservation,inference,reasoning,andtesting,theonlyprocesswithintellectualimport,isdismissedasirrelevanttothetheoryofknowing.Themethodsofknowingpractisedindailylifeandscienceareexcludedfromconsiderationinthephilosophicaltheoryofknowing.Hencetheconstructionsofthelatterbecomemoreandmoreelaboratelyartiﬁcialbecausethereisnodeﬁnitecheckuponthem.Itwouldbeeasytoquotefromepistemologicalwritersstatementstotheeﬀectthattheseprocesses(whichsupplytheonlyempiricallyveriﬁablefactsofknowing)aremerelyinductiveincharacter,oreventhattheyareofpurelypsychologicalsigniﬁcance.Itwouldbediﬃculttoﬁndamorecompleteinversionofthefactsthaninthelatterstatement,sincepresentationconstitutesinfactthepsychologicalaﬀair.Aconfusionoflogicwithphysiologicalphysiologyhasbredhybridepistemology,withtheamazingresultthatthetechniqueofeﬀectiveinquiryisrenderedirrelevanttothetheoryofknowing,andthosephysicaleventsinvolvedintheoccurrenceofdataforknowingaretreatedasiftheyconstitutedtheactofknowing.VWhatarethebearingsofourdiscussionupontheconceptionofthepresentscopeandoﬃceofphilosophy?Whatdoourconclusionsindicateanddemandwithreferencetophilosophyitself?Forthephilosophywhichreachessuchconclusionsregardingknowledgeandmindmustapplythem,sincerelyandwhole-heartedly,toitsideaofitsownnature.Forphilosophyclaimstobeoneformormodeofknowing.If,then,theconclusionisreachedthatknowingisawayofemployingempiricaloccurrenceswithrespecttoincreasingpowertodirecttheconsequenceswhichﬂowfromthings,theapplicationoftheconclusionmustbemadetophilosophyitself.It,too,becomesnotacontemplativesurveyofexistencenorananalysisofwhatispastanddonewith,butanoutlookuponfuturepossibilitieswithreferencetoattainingthebetterandavertingtheworse.Philosophymusttake,withgoodgrace,itsownmedicine.Itiseasiertostatethenegativeresultsofthechangedideaofphilosophythanthepositiveones.Thepointthatoccurstomindmostreadilyisthatphilosophywillhavetosurrenderallpretensiontobepeculiarlyconcernedwithultimatereality,orwithrealityasacomplete(i.e.,completed)whole:with12Conception-presentationhas,ofcourse,beenmadebymanyinthehistoryofspeculationanexceptiontothisstatement;“pure”memoryisalsomadeanexceptionbyBergson.Totakecognizanceofthismatterwould,ofcourse,accentuate,notrelieve,thediﬃcultyremarkeduponinthetext.24
therealobject.Thesurrenderisnoteasyofachievement.ThephilosophictraditionthatcomestousfromclassicGreekthoughtandthatwasreinforcedbyChristianphilosophyintheMiddleAgesdiscriminatesphilosophicalknowingfromothermodesofknowingbymeansofanallegedpeculiarlyintimateconcernwithsupreme,ultimate,truereality.Todenythistraittophilosophyseemstomanytobethesuicideofphilosophy;tobeasystematicadoptionofskepticismoragnosticpositivism.ThepervasivenessofthetraditionisshowninthefactthatsovitallyacontemporarythinkerasBergson,whoﬁndsaphilosophicrevolutioninvolvedinabandonmentofthetraditionalidentiﬁcationofthetrulyrealwiththeﬁxed(anidentiﬁcationinheritedfromGreekthought),doesnotﬁnditinhishearttoabandonthecounterpartidentiﬁcationofphilosophywithsearchforthetrulyReal;andhenceﬁndsitnecessarytosubstituteanultimateandabsoluteﬂuxforanultimateandabsolutepermanence.Thushisgreatempiricalservicesincallingattentiontothefundamentalimportanceofconsiderationsoftimeforproblemsoflifeandmindgetcompromisedwithamystic,non-empirical“Intuition”;andweﬁndhimpreoccupiedwithsolving,bymeansofhisnewideaofultimatereality,thetraditionalproblemsofrealities-in-themselvesandphenomena,matterandmind,free-willanddeterminism,Godandtheworld.Isnotthatanotherevidenceoftheinﬂuenceoftheclassicideaaboutphilosophy?Eventhenewrealistsarenotcontenttotaketheirrealismasapleaforapproachingsubject-matterdirectlyinsteadofthroughtheinterventionofepis-temologicalapparatus;theyﬁnditnecessaryﬁrsttodeterminethestatusoftherealobject.Thustheytoobecomeentangledintheproblemofthepossibilityoferror,dreams,hallucinations,etc.,inshort,theproblemofevil.ForItakeitthatanuncorruptedrealismwouldacceptsuchthingsasrealevents,andﬁndinthemnootherproblemsthanthoseattendingtheconsiderationofanyrealoccurrence—namely,problemsofstructure,origin,andoperation.Itisoftensaidthatpragmatism,unlessitiscontenttobeacontributiontomeremethodology,mustdevelopatheoryofReality.ButthechiefcharacteristictraitofthepragmaticnotionofrealityispreciselythatnotheoryofRealityingeneral,überhaupt,ispossibleorneeded.Itoccupiesthepositionofanemancipatedempiricismorathoroughgoingnaïverealism.Itﬁndsthat“reality”isadenotativeterm,awordusedtodesignateindiﬀerentlyeverythingthathappens.Lies,dreams,insanities,deceptions,myths,theoriesareallofthemjusttheeventswhichtheyspeciﬁcallyare.Pragmatismiscontenttotakeitsstandwithscience;forscienceﬁndsallsucheventstobesubject-matterofdescriptionandinquiry—justlikestarsandfossils,mosquitoesandmalaria,circulationandvision.Italsotakesitsstandwithdailylife,whichﬁndsthatsuchthingsreallyhavetobereckonedwithastheyoccurinterwoveninthetextureofevents.Theonlywayinwhichthetermrealitycaneverbecomemorethanablanketdenotativetermisthroughrecoursetospeciﬁceventsinalltheirdiversityandthatness.Speakingsummarily,IﬁndthattheretentionbyphilosophyofthenotionofaRealityfeudallysuperiortotheeventsofeverydayoccurrenceisthechiefsourceoftheincreasingisolationofphilosophyfromcommonsenseandscience.Forthelatterdonotoperateinanysuchregion.Aswiththemofold,25
philosophyindealingwithrealdiﬃcultiesﬁndsitselfstillhamperedbyreferencetorealitiesmorereal,moreultimate,thanthosewhichdirectlyhappen.Ihavesaidthatidentifyingthecauseofphilosophywiththenotionofsuperiorrealityisthecauseofanincreasingisolationfromscienceandpracticallife.Thephraseremindsusthattherewasatimewhentheenterpriseofscienceandthemoralinterestsofmenbothmovedinauniverseinvidiouslydistinguishedfromthatofordinaryoccurrence.Whileallthathappensisequallyreal—sinceitreallyhappens—happeningsarenotofequalworth.Theirrespectiveconsequences,theirimport,variestremendously.Counterfeitmoney,althoughreal(orratherbecausereal),isreallydiﬀerentfromvalidcirculatorymedium,justasdiseaseisreallydiﬀerentfromhealth;diﬀerentinspeciﬁcstructureandsodiﬀerentinconsequences.Inoccidentalthought,theGreeksweretheﬁrsttodrawthedistinctionbetweenthegenuineandthespuriousinageneralizedfashionandtoformulateandenforceitstremendoussigniﬁcancefortheconductoflife.Butsincetheyhadatcommandnotechniqueofexperimentalanalysisandnoadequatetechniqueofmathematicalanalysis,theywerecompelledtotreatthediﬀerenceofthetrueandthefalse,thedependableandthedeceptive,assignifyingtwokindsofexistence,thetrulyrealandtheapparentlyreal.Twopointscanhardlybeassertedwithtoomuchemphasis.TheGreekswerewhollyrightinthefeelingthatquestionsofgoodandill,asfarastheyfallwithinhumancontrol,areboundupwithdiscriminationofthegenuinefromthespurious,of“being”fromwhatonlypretendstobe.Butbecausetheylackedadequateinstrumentalitiesforcopingwiththisdiﬀerenceinspeciﬁcsituations,theywereforcedtotreatthediﬀerenceasawholesaleandrigidone.Sciencewasconcernedwithvisionofultimateandtruereality;opinionwasconcernedwithgettingalongwithapparentrealities.Eachhaditsappropriateregionpermanentlymarkedoﬀ.Mattersofopinioncouldneverbecomemattersofscience;theirintrinsicnatureforbade.Whenthepracticeofsciencewentonundersuchconditions,scienceandphilosophywereoneandthesamething.Bothhadtodowithultimaterealityinitsrigidandinsuperablediﬀerencefromordinaryoccurrences.Wehaveonlytorefertothewayinwhichmedievallifewroughtthephilosophyofanultimateandsupremerealityintothecontextofpracticallifetorealizethatforcenturiespoliticalandmoralinterestswereboundupwiththedistinctionbetweentheabsolutelyrealandtherelativelyreal.Thediﬀerencewasnomatterofaremotetechnicalphilosophy,butonewhichcontrolledlifefromthecradletothegrave,fromthegravetotheendlesslifeafterdeath.Bymeansofavastinstitution,whichineﬀectwasstateaswellaschurch,theclaimsofultimaterealitywereenforced;meansofaccesstoitwereprovided.AcknowledgmentofTheRealitybroughtsecurityinthisworldandsalvationinthenext.Itisnotnecessarytoreportthestoryofthechangewhichhassincetakenplace.Itisenoughforourpurposestonotethatnoneofthemodernphilosophiesofasuperiorreality,ortherealobject,idealisticorrealistic,holdsthatitsinsightmakesadiﬀerencelikethatbetweensinandholiness,eternalcondemnationandeternalbliss.Whileinitsowncontextthephilosophyofultimaterealityenteredintothevitalconcernsofmen,itnowtendstobeaningeniousdialectic26
exercisedinprofessorialcornersbyafewwhohaveretainedancientpremiseswhilerejectingtheirapplicationtotheconductoflife.Theincreasedisolationfromscienceofanyphilosophyidentiﬁedwiththeproblemoftherealisequallymarked.Forthegrowthofsciencehasconsistedpreciselyintheinventionofanequipment,atechniqueofappliancesandpro-cedures,which,acceptingalloccurrencesashomogeneouslyreal,proceedstodistinguishtheauthenticatedfromthespurious,thetruefromthefalse,byspeciﬁcmodesoftreatmentinspeciﬁcsituations.Theproceduresofthetrainedengineer,ofthecompetentphysician,ofthelaboratoryexpert,haveturnedouttobetheonlywaysofdiscriminatingthecounterfeitfromthevalid.Andtheyhaverevealedthatthediﬀerenceisnotoneofantecedentﬁxityofexistence,butoneofmodeoftreatmentandoftheconsequencesthereonattendant.Aftermankindhaslearnedtoputitstrustinspeciﬁcproceduresinordertomakeitsdiscriminationsbetweenthefalseandthetrue,philosophyarrogatestoitselftheenforcementofthedistinctionatitsowncost.Morethanonce,thisessayhasintimatedthatthecounterpartoftheideaofinvidiouslyrealrealityisthespectatornotionofknowledge.Iftheknower,howeverdeﬁned,issetoveragainsttheworldtobeknown,knowingconsistsinpossessingatranscript,moreorlessaccuratebutotiose,ofrealthings.Whetherthistranscriptispresentativeincharacter(asrealistssay)orwhetheritisbymeansofstatesofconsciousnesswhichrepresentthings(assubjectivistssay),isamatterofgreatimportanceinitsowncontext.But,inanotherregard,thisdiﬀerenceisnegligibleincomparisonwiththepointinwhichbothagree.Knowingisviewingfromoutside.Butifitbetruethattheselforsubjectofexperienceispartandparcelofthecourseofevents,itfollowsthattheselfbecomesaknower.Itbecomesamindinvirtueofadistinctivewayofpartakinginthecourseofevents.Thesigniﬁcantdistinctionisnolongerbetweentheknowerandtheworld;itisbetweendiﬀerentwaysofbeinginandofthemovementofthings;betweenabrutephysicalwayandapurposive,intelligentway.Thereisnocalltorepeatindetailthestatementswhichhavebeenadvanced.Theirnetpurportisthatthedirectivepresenceoffuturepossibilitiesindealingwithexistentconditionsiswhatismeantbyknowing;thattheselfbecomesaknowerormindwhenanticipationoffutureconsequencesoperatesasitsstimulus.Whatwearenowconcernedwithistheeﬀectofthisconceptionuponthenatureofphilosophicknowing.AsfarasIcanjudge,popularresponsetopragmaticphilosophywasmovedbytwoquitediﬀerentconsiderations.Bysomeitwasthoughttoprovideanewspeciesofsanctions,anewmodeofapologetics,forcertainreligiousideaswhosestandinghadbeenthreatened.Byothers,itwaswelcomedbecauseitwastakenasasignthatphilosophywasabouttosurrenderitsotioseandspeculativeremoteness;thatphilosopherswerebeginningtorecognizethatphilosophyisofaccountonlyif,likeeverydayknowingandlikescience,itaﬀordsguidancetoactionandtherebymakesadiﬀerenceintheevent.Itwaswelcomedasasignthatphilosopherswerewillingtohavetheworthoftheirphilosophizingmeasuredbyresponsibletests.Ihavenotseenthispointofviewemphasized,orhardlyrecognized,by27
professionalcritics.Thediﬀerenceofattitudecanprobablybeeasilyexplained.Theepistemologicaluniverseofdiscourseissohighlytechnicalthatonlythosewhohavebeentrainedinthehistoryofthoughtthinkintermsofit.Itdidnotoccur,accordingly,tonon-technicalreaderstointerpretthedoctrinethatthemeaningandvalidityofthoughtareﬁxedbydiﬀerencesmadeinconsequencesandinsatisfactoriness,tomeanconsequencesinpersonalfeelings.Thosewhowereprofessionallytrained,however,tookthestatementtomeanthatconsciousnessormindinthemereactoflookingatthingsmodiﬁesthem.Itunderstoodthedoctrineoftestofvaliditybyconsequencestomeanthatapprehensionsandconceptionsaretrueifthemodiﬁcationsaﬀectedbythemwereofanemotionallydesirabletone.Priordiscussionshouldhavemadeitreasonablyclearthatthesourceofthismisunderstandingliesintheneglectoftemporalconsiderations.Thechangemadeinthingsbytheselfinknowingisnotimmediateand,sotosay,cross-sectional.Itislongitudinal—intheredirectiongiventochangesalreadygoingon.Itsanalogueisfoundinthechangeswhichtakeplaceinthedevelopmentof,say,ironoreintoawatch-spring,notinthoseofthemiracleoftransubstantiation.Forthestatic,cross-sectional,non-temporalrelationofsubjectandobject,thepragmatichypothesissubstitutesapprehensionofathingintermsoftheresultsinotherthingswhichitistendingtoeﬀect.Fortheuniqueepistemologicalrelation,itsubstitutesapracticalrelationofafamiliartype:—responsivebehaviorwhichchangesintimethesubject-mattertowhichitapplies.Theuniquethingabouttheresponsivebehaviorwhichconstitutesknowingisthespeciﬁcdiﬀerencewhichmarksitoﬀfromothermodesofresponse,namely,thepartplayedinitbyanticipationandprediction.Knowingistheact,stimulatedbythisforesight,ofsecuringandavertingconsequences.Thesuccessoftheachievementmeasuresthestandingoftheforesightbywhichresponseisdirected.Thepopularimpressionthatpragmaticphilosophymeansthatphilosophyshalldevelopideasrelevanttotheactualcrisesoflife,ideasinﬂuentialindealingwiththemandtestedbytheassistancetheyaﬀord,iscorrect.Referencetopracticalresponsesuggests,however,anothermisapprehension.Manycriticshavejumpedattheobviousassociationofthewordpragmaticwithpractical.Theyhaveassumedthattheintentistolimitallknowledge,philosophicincluded,topromoting“action,”understandingbyactioneitherjustanybodilymovement,orthosebodilymovementswhichconducetothepreservationandgrosserwell-beingofthebody.James’statement,thatgeneralconceptionsmust“cashin”hasbeentaken(especiallybyEuropeancritics)tomeanthattheendandmeasureofintelligenceliesinthenarrowandcoarseutilitieswhichitproduces.EvenanacuteAmericanthinker,afterﬁrstcriticizingpragmatismasakindofidealisticepistemology,goesontotreatitasadoctrinewhichregardsintelligenceasalubricatingoilfacilitatingtheworkingsofthebody.Onesourceofthemisunderstandingissuggestedbythefactthat“cashingin”toJamesmeantthatageneralideamustalwaysbecapableofveriﬁcationinspeciﬁcexistentialcases.Thenotionof“cashingin”saysnothingaboutthebreadthordepthofthespeciﬁcconsequences.Asanempiricaldoctrine,it28
couldnotsayanythingaboutthemingeneral;thespeciﬁccasesmustspeakforthemselves.Ifoneconceptionisveriﬁedintermsofeatingbeefsteak,andanotherintermsofafavorablecreditbalanceinthebank,thatisnotbecauseofanythinginthetheory,butbecauseofthespeciﬁcnatureoftheconceptionsinquestion,andbecausethereexistparticulareventslikehungerandtrade.Iftherearealsoexistencesinwhichthemostliberalestheticideasandthemostgenerousmoralconceptionscanbeveriﬁedbyspeciﬁcembodiment,assuredlysomuchthebetter.Thefactthatastrictlyempiricalphilosophywastakenbysomanycriticstoimplyanaprioridogmaaboutthekindofconsequencescapableofexistenceisevidence,Ithink,oftheinabilityofmanyphilosopherstothinkinconcretelyempiricalterms.Sincethecriticswerethemselvesaccustomedtogetresultsbymanipulatingtheconceptsof“consequences”andof“practice,”theyassumedthatevenawould-beempiricistmustbedoingthesamesortofthing.Itwill,Isuppose,remainforalongtimeincredibletosomethataphilosophershouldreallyintendtogotospeciﬁcexperiencestodetermineofwhatscopeanddepthpracticeadmits,andwhatsortofconsequencestheworldpermitstocomeintobeing.Conceptsaresoclear;ittakessolittletimetodeveloptheirimplications;experiencesaresoconfused,anditrequiressomuchtimeandenergytolayholdofthem.Andyetthesesamecriticschargepragmatismwithadoptingsubjectiveandemotionalstandards!Asamatteroffact,thepragmatictheoryofintelligencemeansthatthefunctionofmindistoprojectnewandmorecomplexends—tofreeexperiencefromroutineandfromcaprice.Nottheuseofthoughttoaccomplishpurposesalreadygiveneitherinthemechanismofthebodyorinthatoftheexistentstateofsociety,buttheuseofintelligencetoliberateandliberalizeaction,isthepragmaticlesson.Actionrestrictedtogivenandﬁxedendsmayattaingreattechnicaleﬃciency;buteﬃciencyistheonlyqualitytowhichitcanlayclaim.Suchactionismechanical(orbecomesso),nomatterwhatthescopeofthepreformedend,beittheWillofGodorKultur.Butthedoctrinethatintelligencedevelopswithinthesphereofactionforthesakeofpossibilitiesnotyetgivenistheoppositeofadoctrineofmechanicaleﬃciency.Intelligenceasintelligenceisinherentlyforward-looking;onlybyignoringitsprimaryfunctiondoesitbecomeameremeansforanendalreadygiven.Thelatterisservile,evenwhentheendislabeledmoral,religious,oresthetic.Butactiondirectedtoendstowhichtheagenthasnotpreviouslybeenattachedinevitablycarrieswithitaquickenedandenlargedspirit.Apragmaticintelligenceisacreativeintelligence,notaroutinemechanic.Allthismayreadlikeadefenseofpragmatismbyoneconcernedtomakeoutforitthebestcasepossible.Suchisnot,however,theintention.Thepurposeistoindicatetheextenttowhichintelligencefreesactionfromamechanicallyinstrumentalcharacter.Intelligenceis,indeed,instrumentalthroughactiontothedeterminationofthequalitiesoffutureexperience.Buttheveryfactthattheconcernofintelligenceiswiththefuture,withtheas-yet-unrealized(andwiththegivenandtheestablishedonlyasconditionsoftherealizationofpossibilities),makestheactioninwhichittakeseﬀectgenerousandliberal;freeofspirit.Justthatactionwhichextendsandapprovesintelligencehasan29
intrinsicvalueofitsowninbeinginstrumental:—theintrinsicvalueofbeinginformedwithintelligenceinbehalfoftheenrichmentoflife.Bythesamestroke,intelligencebecomestrulyliberal:knowingisahumanundertaking,notanestheticappreciationcarriedonbyareﬁnedclassoracapitalisticpossessionofafewlearnedspecialists,whethermenofscienceorofphilosophy.Moreemphasishasbeenputuponwhatphilosophyisnotthanuponwhatitmaybecome.Butitisnotnecessary,itisnotevendesirable,tosetforthphilosophyasascheduledprogram.Therearehumandiﬃcultiesofanurgent,deep-seatedkindwhichmaybeclariﬁedbytrainedreﬂection,andwhosesolutionmaybeforwardedbythecarefuldevelopmentofhypotheses.Whenitisunder-stoodthatphilosophicthinkingiscaughtupintheactualcourseofevents,havingtheoﬃceofguidingthemtowardsaprosperousissue,problemswillabundantlypresentthemselves.Philosophywillnotsolvetheseproblems;philosophyisvision,imagination,reﬂection—andthesefunctions,apartfromaction,modifynothingandhenceresolvenothing.Butinacomplicatedandperverseworld,actionwhichisnotinformedwithvision,imagination,andreﬂection,ismorelikelytoincreaseconfusionandconﬂictthantostraightenthingsout.Itisnoteasyforgenerousandsustainedreﬂectiontobecomeaguidingandilluminatingmethodinaction.UntilitfreesitselffromidentiﬁcationwithproblemswhicharesupposedtodependuponRealityassuch,oritsdistinctionfromaworldofAppearance,oritsrelationtoaKnowerassuch,thehandsofphilosophyaretied.Havingnochancetolinkitsfortuneswitharesponsiblecareerbysuggestingthingstobetried,itcannotidentifyitselfwithquestionswhichactuallyariseinthevicissitudesoflife.Philosophyrecoversitselfwhenitceasestobeadevicefordealingwiththeproblemsofphilosophersandbecomesamethod,cultivatedbyphilosophers,fordealingwiththeproblemsofmen.Emphasismustvarywiththestressandspecialimpactofthetroubleswhichperplexmen.Eachageknowsitsownills,andseeksitsownremedies.Onedoesnothavetoforecastaparticularprogramtonotethatthecentralneedofanyprogramatthepresentdayisanadequateconceptionofthenatureofintelligenceanditsplaceinaction.Philosophycannotdisavowresponsibilityformanymisconceptionsofthenatureofintelligencewhichnowhamperitseﬃcaciousoperation.Ithasatleastanegativetaskimposeduponit.Itmusttakeawaytheburdenswhichithaslaidupontheintelligenceofthecommonmaninstrugglingwithhisdiﬃculties.Itmustdenyandejectthatintelligencewhichisnaughtbutadistanteye,registeringinaremoteandalienmediumthespectacleofnatureandlife.Toenforcethefactthattheemergenceofimaginationandthoughtisrelativetotheconnexionofthesuﬀeringsofmenwiththeirdoingsisofitselftoilluminatethosesuﬀeringsandtoinstructthosedoings.Tocatchmindinitsconnexionwiththeentranceofthenovelintothecourseoftheworldistobeontheroadtoseethatintelligenceisitselfthemostpromisingofallnovelties,therevelationofthemeaningofthattransformationofpastintofuturewhichistherealityofeverypresent.Torevealintelligenceastheorganfortheguidanceofthistransformation,thesoledirectorofitsquality,istomakeadeclarationofpresentuntoldsigniﬁcanceforaction.Toelaboratetheseconvictionsoftheconnexionofintelligencewithwhatmenundergobecauseof30
theirdoingsandwiththeemergenceanddirectionofthecreative,thenovel,intheworldisofitselfaprogramwhichwillkeepphilosophersbusyuntilsomethingmoreworthwhileisforceduponthem.Fortheelaborationhastobemadethroughapplicationtoallthedisciplineswhichhaveanintimateconnexionwithhumanconduct:—tologic,ethics,esthetics,economics,andtheprocedureofthesciencesformalandnatural.Ialsobelievethatthereisagenuinesenseinwhichtheenforcementofthepivotalpositionofintelligenceintheworldandtherebyincontrolofhumanfortunes(sofarastheyaremanageable)isthepeculiarproblemintheproblemsoflifewhichcomehomemostcloselytoourselves—toourselveslivingnotmerelyintheearlytwentiethcenturybutintheUnitedStates.Itiseasytobefoolishabouttheconnexionofthoughtwithnationallife.ButIdonotseehowanyonecanquestionthedistinctivelynationalcolorofEnglish,orFrench,orGermanphilosophies.AndifoflatethehistoryofthoughthascomeunderthedominationoftheGermandogmaofaninnerevolutionofideas,itrequiresbutalittleinquirytoconvinceoneselfthatthatdogmaitselftestiﬁestoaparticularlynationalisticneedandorigin.IbelievethatphilosophyinAmericawillbelostbetweenchewingahistoriccudlongsincereducedtowoodyﬁber,oranapologeticsforlostcauses(losttonaturalscience),orascholastic,schematicformalism,unlessitcansomehowbringtoconsciousnessAmerica’sownneedsanditsownimplicitprincipleofsuccessfulaction.Thisneedandprinciple,Iamconvinced,isthenecessityofadeliberatecontrolofpoliciesbythemethodofintelligence,anintelligencewhichisnotthefacultyofintellecthonoredintext-booksandneglectedelsewhere,butwhichisthesum-totalofimpulses,habits,emotions,records,anddiscoverieswhichforecastwhatisdesirableandundesirableinfuturepossibilities,andwhichcontriveingeniouslyinbehalfofimaginedgood.Ourlifehasnobackgroundofsanctiﬁedcategoriesuponwhichwemayfallback;werelyuponprecedentasauthorityonlytoourownundoing—forwithusthereissuchacontinuouslynovelsituationthatﬁnalrelianceuponprecedententailssomeclassinterestguidingusbythenosewhitheritwill.Britishempiricism,withitsappealtowhathasbeeninthepast,is,afterall,onlyakindofapriorism.Foritlaysdownaﬁxedruleforfutureintelligencetofollow;andonlytheimmersionofphilosophyintechnicallearningpreventsourseeingthatthisistheessenceofapriorism.Weprideourselvesuponbeingrealistic,desiringahardheadedcognizanceoffacts,anddevotedtomasteringthemeansoflife.Weprideourselvesuponapracticalidealism,alivelyandeasilymovedfaithinpossibilitiesasyetunrealized,inwillingnesstomakesacriﬁcefortheirrealization.Idealismeasilybecomesasanctionofwasteandcarefulness,andrealismasanctionoflegalformalisminbehalfofthingsastheyare—therightsofthepossessor.Wethustendtocombinealooseandineﬀectiveoptimismwithassenttothedoctrineoftakewhotakecan:adeiﬁcationofpower.Allpeoplesatalltimeshavebeennarrowlyrealisticinpracticeandhavethenemployedidealizationtocoverupinsentimentandtheorytheirbrutalities.Butnever,perhaps,hasthetendencybeensodangerousandsotemptingaswithourselves.Faithinthepowerofintelligence31
toimagineafuturewhichistheprojectionofthedesirableinthepresent,andtoinventtheinstrumentalitiesofitsrealization,isoursalvation.Anditisafaithwhichmustbenurturedandmadearticulate:surelyasuﬃcientlylargetaskforourphilosophy.32

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